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THE JURY, THE COURT-MARTIAL,
AND THE CONSTITUTION*
Eugene M. Van Loan III t
where is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies or
the navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction, which
is not contained in or derived from the Constitution.
Chief Justice Chase1
Military justice often has attracted the attention and interest of
Americans. Events such as the Andersonville trial at the close of the
Civil War, the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell in 1925,2 and
the Nuremberg trials after World War II 3 have been portrayed in
the high drama of theater and screen. Significant military trials such
as the court-martial of Major John Andrd, Benedict Arnold's co-
conspirator in the Revolutionary War,- the trial of the Somers muti-
neers in 1842, 5 and the prosecutions of the Korean prisoners of war
in the 1950's" are also familiar to students of American history. The
war in Vietnam, however, has probably raised public interest in
military justice to its greatest intensity in our history. The trials of
Captain Howard Levy,7 Second Lieutenant Henry Howe,8 and the
* The author wishes to thank Thomas W. Kolberg for his counsel and assistance
in the preparation of this article.
t Member of the New Hampshire Bar. A.B. 1964, Yale University; LL.B. 1967, Har-
vard University.
1 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141 (1866) (concurring opinion).
2 See Wigmore, Demogogic Abuse of Courts-Martial: The Mitchell Trial, 20 ILL. L.
REV. 742 (1926); Wigmore, The Mitchell Court-Martial, 20 ILL. L. Rlv. 487 (1926).
3 See, e.g., G. CREEL, WAR CRIMINALS AND PUNISHMENT (1944); S. GLUECK, WAR CRIM-
INALs: THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944); R. STOREY, THE FINAL JUDGMENT?
PEARL HARBOR To NUREMBERG 77-156 (1968).
4 See generally J. FLEXNER, THE TRArrOR AND THE Spy: BENEDICT ARNOLD AND JOHN
ANDRP (1953); 0. SHERWIN, BENEDICT ARNOLD: PATRIOT AND TRAITOR (1931); W. WALLACE,
TRAITOROUS HERO: THE LIr AND FORTUNES OF BENEDICT ARNOLD (1954).
5 See E. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 14-17 (1970).
6 See A. BIDERMAN, MARCH TO CALUMNY: THE STORY OF AMERICAN P.O.W.'s IN THE
KOREAN WAR (1963); E. KINKEAD, IN EVERY WAR BUT ONE (1959); Prugh, The Code of
Conduct for the Armed Forces, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 678 (1956); Note, Misconduct in the
Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases, 56 COLUM. L.
REv. 709 (1956).
7 CM 416463, Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968). See R. SmrmR, MILITARY JusTIcE Is TO
JUSTICE As MILITARY MUSIC Is TO MUSIC ch. 4 (1970); Note, Military Law, 9 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 169 (1968).
8 United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967). See Sherman, The
Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 325, 334-52
(1971).
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Presidio "mutineers"9 all have attracted a great deal of publicity and
served to focus domestic attention upon military justice.1 0 War crimes
prosecution in the Green Beret and My Lai cases has in particular
converted casual concern to national distress.1'
I
MILITARY PROCEEDINGS AND TRIAL BY JURY
In the recent flood of commentary about these cases and military
justice in general, antagonists on both sides have reached many differ-
ent conclusions about the quality of military justice. Each, however,
has in part predicated his comparison of military and civilian justice
upon an identical assumption: there is no right to trial by jury in the
military.
A. The Right to Jury Trial as a Limitation on Military Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court itself encouraged this assumption in its major
opinions respecting the jurisdictional reach of military justice. In
1955 the Court held in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles12 that
the military had no jurisdiction to try a civilian by court-martial for
offenses committed while on active military duty. One rationale for
this landmark case was that since both the right to indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury as guaranteed by the fifth and sixth
amendments were not extended to defendants in courts-martial, sub-
jection of civilians to a military trial would result in a deprivation of
9 ACM 420276, Sood, 42 C.M.R. 635, petition denied, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 42 C.M.R.
356 (1970). See R. SHERRILL, supra note 7, ch. 2.
10 Although the Pueblo incident resulted in no court-martial, its aftermath also
drew much public attention to the workings of military justice. See, e.g., Finer, The Sec-
ond Ordeal of the Pueblo Crew, 55 A.B.A.J. 1029 (1969); Harvey & Newsome, Rebuttals
to "The Second Ordeal of the Pueblo Crew," 56 A.B.A.J. 148 (1970). Also of interest to
observers of military justice, although they received less publicity, were the courts-martial
of Lieutenant Susan Schnall and Captain Dale P. Noyd. lieutenant Schnall had thrown
antiwar leaflets from an airplane and participated in uniform in an antiwar rally. She
was convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and failure to obey an order. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1969, at 14, col. 4. Captain Noyd had become a conscientious objector after having
accepted his commission. He was convicted of failure to obey an order. United States v.
Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969).
11 See, e.g., W. GERBER, WAR ATRocrrns AND THE LAW (1970); WAR Camsss AND THE
AmmucAN CONSCIENCE (E. Knoll & J. McFadden eds. 1970); Keeffe, The Soldiers of My
Lai and Courts-Martial, 56 A.B.A.J. 192 (1970); Sherman, Military Justice: Learning from
the Green Berets, THE NATION, Oct. 20, 1969, at 399; Comment, My Lai Massacre: The
Need for an International Investigation, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 703 (1970).
12 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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their constitutional rights.13 Two years later the Court in Reid v.
Covert14 reversed on similar grounds the conviction by court-martial
of a serviceman's civilian dependent: 15
Art. III, § 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that cer-
tain express safeguards, which were designed to protect persons
from oppressive governmental practices, shall be given in criminal
prosecutions-safeguards which cannot be given in a military
trial.16
In 1969, the Court decided O'Callahan v. Parker.17 Even with re-
gard to persons subject to military law, the Court held, a court-martial
possessed no peacetime domestic jurisdiction over offenses that were
not "service connected."' 8 According to the Court, such courts-martial
would unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury available to the accused in civilian
courts.' 9 The full thrust of the Court's assumptions about military
justice and its ability to conduct a fair trial was made apparent by
Mr. Justice Douglas in the majority opinion:
[G]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law.... A civilian trial,
in other words, is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protec-
tion of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the
age-old manfest destiny of retributive justice.2 0
13 Id. at 16-19. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122-24 (1866); cf. Wise v.
Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806).
14 354 US. 1 (1957), rev'g 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
15 See also Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), rev'g 351 U.S. 470 (1956). The lit-
erature generated by these opinions and similar decisions (e.g., McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 861 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella
v. Singleton, 361 US. 284 (1960)), is voluminous. For a sampling, see F. WIENER, CIVILIANS
UNDER MILITARY Jus'IE:TnHE BRISH PRACrxic SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMERrCA
(1967); Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Reg-
ulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 317 (1964); Everett, Military
Jurisdiction over Civilians, 1960 DUKE L.J. 366; Girard, The Constitution and Court-Mar-
tial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 461 (1961); Harrison, Court-Martial Jurisdiction of Civilians-A Glimpse at Some
Constitutional Issues, 7 MIL. L. REv. 61 (1960); Maurer, The Court-Martialing of Camp
Followers, World War 1, 9 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 203 (1965); Wren, Court-Martial Jurisdic-
tion over Naval Reservists, 17 JAG J. 5 (1968).
16 354 US. at 22 (emphasis added).
17 895 U.S. 258 (1969).
1s Id. at 272-73. See also Miller, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Since O'Callahan, 51 MIL.
L. REv. 77 (1971); Rice, O'Callahan v.- Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction, "Service-Con-
nection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51 MIL. L. REv. 41 (1971).
19 395 US. at 262.
20 Id. at 265-66. But see Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rzv, 181 (1962).
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Undoubtedly one strand of the Court's logic in Toth and O'Calla-
han is an apparent conclusion that the Constitution grants no power to
the President and Congress to convene courts-martial for the trial of
civilians or non-service connected offenses.2 1 On the other hand, the
Court has not been satisfied to rest its decisions solely upon this pur-
ported lack of constitutional authorization; it has also held that such
courts-martial work a deprivation of the constitutionally protected
rights to a grand and petit jury.
But to the extent that reliance has been placed upon deprivation of
these rights, the Court has shrouded its precise rationale in ambiguity.
One possibility is that the Court has determined that the intrinsic
nature of the court-martial precludes the military in practice from ever
affording an accused the equivalent of a civilian jury trial. Douglas
struck this note in O'Callahan in his description of military justice:
A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant's peers
which must decide unanimously, but by a panel of officers empow-
ered to act by a two-thirds vote. The presiding officer at a court-
martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are
protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and nurtured by
the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer. Substantially
different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials.
Apart from those differences, the suggestion of the possibility of
influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who con-
venes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and
who usually has direct command authority over its members is a
pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate
the danger.
A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of jus-
tice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.22
Douglas's sentiments echo the conclusions of many professional critics of
the military justice system. Such an evaluation would appear to leave
it open to Congress to alter the result of these cases by introducing a
true jury system into military trials. Nothing in these cases, however,
implies that such legislative manipulation would be constitutionally
permissible.
An alternative argument is that the availability of grand and petit
juries in civilian courts affords a sufficient justification for limiting
21 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267-73 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1955); Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.MA. 264, 272, 41 C.M.R.
264, 272 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
22 895 U.S. at 263-65 (footnotes omitted). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104
(1958) (concurring opinion); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
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military jurisdiction. Although the Court has devoted no significant
attention in its opinions to the existence or nature of such alternative
courts, this thesis is satisfactory to explain the Toth line of cases. 23 In
Toth and Reid, the offenses at issue were committed overseas and there-
fore could not have been tried in the courts of any state. Although no
substantive federal civilian crimes then existed to cover these offenses,
Congress could have created such crimes or could have merely granted
jurisdiction to the federal courts to try the offenses already made pun-
ishable by military law.24 In either case, the offenses would have been
triable in the federal civilian courts and the right to indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury would have unquestionably been
constitutionally available.
The O'Callahan result similarly appears to be explicable as de-
riving from a concern over the military's deprivation of an accused's
otherwise available constitutional rights. Sergeant James O'Callahan in
1956 had been tried by court-martial in the Territory of Hawaii. Since
Hawaii had been "incorporated" into the United States in 1900,25 the
fifth and sixth amendment rights to indictment by grand jury and trial
by petit jury would have been constitutionally available to any person
tried in the federal territorial court.26 Furthermore, there did exist
at that time a substantive territorial offense which would have included
the conduct for which Sergeant O'Callahan had been tried by court-
martial .27 Consequently, the exercise of military jurisdiction in lieu of
civilian jurisdiction clearly did deprive the accused of rights which
would have otherwise been constitutionally required.
The analytical difficulty comes with the recent Supreme Court pro-
23 Notes 12-19 supra.
24 See United States ex tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955). See generally
Schuck, Trial of Civilian Personnel by Foreign Courts, 2 Mm. L. REv. 37 (1958). The
Court of Military Appeals has not taken this aproach in its interpretation of the O'Cal-
lahan rule, however. Rather than rely upon the mere existence of congressional power
to legislate over non-service connected offenses committed overseas, the Court of Military
Appeals has searched for the actual exercise of such power. Where in fact Congress has
not acted and no substantive federal civilian crime already exists, the court has concluded
that an accused before an overseas court-martial has no constitutional rights to a grand
jury or petit jury; consequently, the military has jurisdiction in such cases even if the
offenses are not service connected. United States v. Keaton, 19 US.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R.
64 (1969).
25 Act of April 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141.
26 Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898).
27 The Court implied that there was a substantive territorial offense which O'Calla-
han committed. 395 U.S. at 273-74. Compare the more explicit language of the dissent
in United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 553, 40 C.M.R. 259, 265 (1970).. .- -
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
nouncement in Relford v. Commandant.28 This is the first case before
the Court to involve an offense committed within a state of the United
States and the first, therefore, in which there existed something other
than a federal forum as an alternative to the court-martial. Defendant
was convicted of rape in 1961 by a court-martial at Fort Dix, New Jer-
sey. Although the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of military juris-
diction, it also noted that the "courts in New Jersey were open and
available for the prosecution of Relford." 29 Although it is not unam-
biguous, this remark apparently refers to the state courts of New Jersey.
If state courts are indeed viewed by the Supreme Court as appropriate
alternatives to courts-martial, the suggested rationale of the Toth
cases appears to break down. At the time of Relford's conviction in
1961, an accused in a state court did not yet have a constitutional right
to trial by petit jury 0 or indictment by grand jury.31 Although by
the date of the Relford decision the Supreme Court had applied the
sixth amendment right to trial by petit jury to the states, 32 its new rule
could not have been retroactively applied to Relford's conviction.33
Moreover, the Court gave no indication in Relford that it meant to
presage an application of the fifth amendment's grand jury guaranty
to the states3 4 or even that it intended to base future decisions solely
on the effect of military jurisdiction upon the right to a petit jury.
Consequently, unless the apparent reference to the state courts of
New Jersey is mere surplusage, the theory that the Supreme Court has
justified its constriction of military jurisdiction because of the military's
28 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
29 Id. at 366. In its enumeration of factors to be considered in determining whether
or not a particular offense was cognizable by the military courts, the Court listed "[t]he
presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted." Id. at
365 (emphasis added).
30 Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947);
Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
31 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); accord, Beck v. Washington, 369 US.
541, 545 (1962) (dictum).
32 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); text accompanying note 46 infra.
33 De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
34 But see 401 U.S. at 362-63:
This case, as did O'Callahan, obviously falls within the area of stress between
the constitutional guarantees contained in the Constitution's Art. III, § 2, c. 3,
in the Sixth Amendment, and possibly in the Fifth Amendment, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the power vested in the Congress, by the Constitution's Art. I,
§ 8, d. 14, "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces," with its supportive Necessary and Proper provision in d. 18, and
the Fifth Amendment's correlative exception for "cases arising in the land or
naval forces."
(emphasis added).
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deprivation of otherwise available constitutional rights is seriously
called into question.3 5
B. The Jury Trial in Nonmilitary Proceedings
Ironically, in the civilian sphere itself the Supreme Court has only
recently fully implemented the Constitution's guaranties of trial by
jury in criminal cases.36 Despite early holdings that trial by jury was
required in the District of Columbia 7 and the incorporated terri-
tories,38 the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution's jury
trial guaranties affected neither the unincorporated territories 9 nor
overseas consular courts.4 0 The sixth amendment, moreover, was at an
early stage held not to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.41 Finally, the right to trial by jury was not deemed to be
constitutionally applicable to cases of criminal contempt1 2 or petty
offenses.43 The language of many of these early cases, although taking
35 The Court of Military Appeals has taken seriously the Supreme Court's emphasis
upon the deprivation of the rights to trial by petit jury and indictment by grand jury.
For example, it has held that since there is no constitutional right to a trial by petit jury
in petty offense cases (Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)), the exercise of military
jurisdiction in such cases is totally unrestricted. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
36 Although they may involve substantial personal and financial deprivations, pro-
ceedings not in the nature of "criminal prosecutions" need not afford a trial by jury.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (juvenile proceeding); Oceanic Steam Nav-
igation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (imposition of customs penalty on transporter
of alien immigrant); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (ex-
pulsion of alien). Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (denationalization
of citizen); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (imprisonment and forfeiture
of goods of alien for illegal entry into country).
37 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); see Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1
(1899) (civil jury).
88 See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346 (1898). The same proposition has
been established for civil juries. See, e.g., Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349 (1900).
39 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Puerto Rico); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (Hawaii).
See generally Garner, The Right of Jury Trial in the Dependencies, 40 Am. L. Rlv. 340
(1906); McClain, The Hawaiian Case, 17 HARv. L. Rlv. 386 (1904).
40 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1957).
41 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
42 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-87 (1958); but Cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968).
43 Schick v. United States, 195 US. 65, 69-70 (1904). See Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930). See
generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee
of Trial by Jury, 39 HAnv. L. Rav. 917 (1926).
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into account the jury's respected position in Anglo-American juris-
prudence,44 clearly indicated that the Court did not consider the jury
a "necessary requisite of due process of law."45
An obvious change in thinking had occurred by 1968, however,
when Mr. Justice White was able to state on behalf of the Court,
Our conclusion is that in the American States, as in the federal
judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses
is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of
justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defen-
dants.4 6
This statement reflects more than just a refinement of the test for in-
corporation of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment.47 The language and the decision also manifest
the Court's more recent concern with the reach and integrity of the
jury trial itself.48 Indeed, one might very well construe even Toth v.
44 See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898):
Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this
great privilege "as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable
common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side
against the approaches of arbitrary power."
quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrITD STATES § 1779
(3d ed. 1858) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
45 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900).
46 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
47 The Court had moved from a requirement that the contested right be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" to a demand that it be "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice." Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), with Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). See generally THE FOURTENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BuL OF RIGHTS: TE INCORPORATION THEORY (L. Levy ed. 1970); Crosskey, Charles Fair-
man, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22
U. Cm. L. R v. 1 (1954); Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 467 (1966); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rrv. 5 (1949); Fairman, A Reply to Profesor Crosskey, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 144 (1954); Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HAxv. L. REv. 746
(1965); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74
(1963); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. Rxv. 1049 (1956);
Lacy, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Evolution of the Absorb-
tion Doctrine, 23 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 37 (1966).
48 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (exclusion from jury of those
opposed to capital punishment deprives one of right to impartial jury); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968) (applying jury trial to charges of serious criminal contempts); Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (limiting instruction on effect of prejudicial evidence
insufficient to guarantee that jury will disregard the evidence); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968) (permitting only jury to impose death penalty is an unconstitutional
inducement to waive jury); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (requiring
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Quarles not only as the initiation of a trend in the Supreme Court
towards a limitation of military jurisdiction, but also as one of the first
indications of an evolving judicial preoccupation with trial by jury and
its auxiliary rights.49
Yet while the Supreme Court has been assiduously engaged in
establishing the jury on all levels of our federal system and generally
strengthening its role in our criminal process, the jury has increasingly
become the target of criticism from sources both within and without
the legal profession. In particular, the jury has been attacked as the
root cause of the delay and backlog in the nation's courts.50 Although
the civil jury has borne the brunt of this particular criticism, the
criminal jury has not escaped it. But inefficiency has always been the
price of justice. The real and biting impact of the recent criticism is
that it has been directed at not only the jury's facility for causing de-
lay but also its inability even to perform the judicial and political
functions which justify its existence. Critics have called into question
the competence of juries composed of laymen to comprehend and digest
the factual and legal complexities to which they are usually exposed in
modem trials.5' On the political level, the jury is being battered from
two quite opposite directions. One school of thought holds that the
traditional role of the jury as a bulwark against an absolute government
and its judicial agents is atavistic in a democratic society where the
law makers and the law enforcers are popularly selected through univer-
sal suffrage.5 2 For these critics the jury is now merely an unnecessary
jury for denationalization of American citizen); but see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (upholding the denial of jury in juvenile proceedings). Similar concern
has been shown for juries in civil actions. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970);
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959).
49 Another reflection of this concern may be found in the myriad of cases dealing with
jury selection and composition. E.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Irwin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Moore v. New
York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948).
50 See, e.g., H. JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS 193-94 (1968); H. ZEIsFL, H. KALVEN & B.
BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Burr, Progress in Trial by Jury, 136 ANNALS 75
(1928); Callender, Jury Trials in Criminal Cases, 125 ANNALS 106 (1926); Landis, Jury
Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.AJ. 950 (1970).
51 J. FRAm, COURTS ON TRIAL 116-20 (1950); H. JAMES, supra note 50, at 196-99;
Boston, Some Practical Remedies for Existing Defects in the Administration of Justice,
61 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10-18 (1912); Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?,
21 U. Cm. L. REv. 386, 387-401 (1954).
52 E.g., Broeder, supra note 51, at 412-13; Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50
VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062-68 (1964); Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13
Micu. L. REv. 802, 305 (1914); see also H. KALVEN & H. ZESEL, THE AmERiCAN JURY chs.
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impediment to effective justice. On the other side are those who accept
the political role of the jury but believe that it has ceased to perform
this function. This group contends that the jury has insinuated itself
into the "establishment" and that it has therefore abdicated its role
as an obstacle to tyranny.53 Indeed, these critics see the recent spate of
"political" trials as evidence of this shift.54 Perhaps the most telling
reflection of the current unpopularity of the jury, however, is its recent
history in England which has all but abolished it in civil cases55 and sub-
stantially diminished its availability in criminal cases.5 6
C. The Constitutional Relationship of the Jury and the Court-Martial
To the extent that the Supreme Court's rationale in Toth, O'Cal-
lahan, and their progeny is based upon the inherent advantages of a
civilian jury trial over a court-martial and the practical unlikelihood
that trial by jury would or could ever be transplanted into military
soil, the current controversy over the efficacy and the merit of the civil-
ian jury casts some doubt upon the viability of these decisions. On the
other hand, to the extent that such cases are based upon the constitu-
tional availability of a jury trial in civilian courts and its constitutional
unavailability in military courts, the mention of state courts in the Rel-
ford case raises some serious questions about the logical integrity of
this argument. Nevertheless, if the rationale is indeed derived from
some notion of constitutional accessability to trial by jury in civilian
as opposed to military courts, it is at least appropriate at this juncture
to lay to rest any lingering doubts about the validity of the military half
of this premise. It is therefore the purpose of this article to establish
that trial by jury was not ever and is not now constitutionally required
in military tribunals.
19-21 (1966); Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 CoLor. L. REv. 419 (1969); Note,
The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALEL.j. 170, 172-78 (1964).53 E.g., Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969);
see also Broeder, supra note 51, at 414-15.
54 See, e.g., THE CONSPRACY TRILL (J. Clavir & J. Spitzer eds. 1970). In such trials
the avowed aim of the defendants is not to rely upori the jury for their vindication and
acquittal, but rather to expose the alleged tyranny of the establishment by intentional
self-conviction and martyrdom at the hands of a supposedly mindless jury of institutional
marionettes.
55 See, e.g., Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 28 & 24 Geo. 5, c.
36, § 6. See also Bok, The Jury System in America, 287 ANNALS 92 (1953); Hall, Trial by
Judge or Jury?, 110 SoL. J. 42 (1966).
56 See Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 86,
§ 1. See also J. FRANK, supra note 51, at 109-10; Heyting, The Abolition of Grand Juries
in England, 19 A.B.A.J. 648 (1938).
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II
JURY TRIALS AND MILITARY JUSTICE BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION
The common assumption that there is no constitutional right to
trial by jury in the military service has customarily been asserted by
both supporters and critics of military justice without supporting
historical documentation. The Constitution does indeed expressly pro-
vide for the right to trial by petit jury in criminal cases; 57 nowhere,
however, does it expressly authorize the creation of courts-martial or any
other separate military tribunal. Nevertheless, Congress's constitutional
power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces"' 8 has consistently been held to provide such au-
thority. 9 There has never been any doubt that military trials conducted
under such authority do not require initiation by a grand jury in-
dictment, for the fifth amendment specifically exempts the military
from its grand jury guaranty.60 Moreover, the sixth amendment has
been construed to contain a similar, but implied, exception for the
57 The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law ....
Id. amend. VI.
58 Id. art. I, § 8.
59 E.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 65, 78-79 (1857); see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137-38 (1866) (concurring
opinion).
60 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The phrase "when in actual service in time of war or public danger" modifies only
the word "Militia" and not the words "the land or naval forces"; consequently, the regular
federal armed forces are exempted from the strictures of the grand jury requirement at
all times. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 n.18 (1969); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109 (1895); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 701 (1882). The seventh amendment civil jury
trial provision---"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "--has no application to
the military whatsoever because of the absence of civil jurisdiction in military courts.
See W. WTurRmop, M=ARY LAW AND PRECEDENTs 55 (2d rev. ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited
as WiNTHRoP). But see 10 OP. ATr'Y GEN. 168 (1862) (power of summary court-martial to
disrate a seaman for unfitness); Peterson, Naval Courts Martial, 20 IND. L.J. 167, 169 (1945).
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military from its petit jury guaranty.61 Despite its significance and its
virtually universal acceptance, however, this conclusion has never been
satisfactorily explored and validated.
A. Jury Trials
Trial by jury in civilian criminal cases was from the first guaran-
teed by the indigenous American colonial charters, ordinances, and
frames of government. The earliest such provision was that appearing in
a 1623 ordinance of the Plymouth Colony in Massachusetts which pro-
vided that "all criminall facts ...should be tried by the verdict of
twelve honest men to be impanelled by authority in forme of a jury
upon their oath."62 In a more classic exposition of the common law
right to trial by an impartial jury of peers from the vicinage,63 the Fun-
damental Constitutions for the Province of East New Jersey of 1683
declared that all accused criminals were to be tried by "lawful judgment
of their peers: ... by twelve men, and as near as it may be, peers and
61 E.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 87 n.68 (1957); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S.
122, 126-27 (1951); Ex parte Quirin, 817 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 123, 137-38 (1866). See also C. BuRDICK, TI-E LAw OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
-ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 262 (1922); W. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 45-48
(1961); E. DUMBAuLD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 370 (1964); F. HELLER, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as HELLER]; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 872 (1960); Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1, 266,
280 (1958); but see, Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Un-
derstanding, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
62 THE COMPAcT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH
28 (W. Brigham ed. 1836). Even earlier, the instructions of King James I in 1606 to the
first Virginia colony had provided that in all capital cases issues were to be decided by
"twelve honest and indifferent persons sworne upon the Evangelists." 1 W. HENING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 67, 69 (1823).
Many of the colonial charters authorized the creation of colonial legislative and judicial
institutions for the enactment and enforcement of any laws not repugnant to the com-
mon law of England. E.g., 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAR-
TERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERE-
TOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 533 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (Conn.)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONS]; 2 id. at 770, 773 (Ga.); 3 id. at 1628, 1638-89, 1642
(Me.); id. at 1680-81 (arts. 7-8) (Md.); id. at 1832 (New England); id. at 1853, 1857-58
(Mass.); 4 id. at 2442 (N.H.); id. at 2447 (Conn.); 5 id. at 2538 (art. 2) (N.J.); id. at 2745-46
(art. 5) 2764 (Carolina); id. at 3088 (Pa.); 6 id. at 3215 (R.I.); 7 id. at 8808-09 (Va.); see 1
id. at 560 (art. 6) (Del.).
63 See generally P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956); W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY
JURY (1852); 1 W. HOLDsWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1-60, 299-386 (7th rev. ed.
1956); B. KEENEY, JUDGMENT BY PEERS (1949); M. LESSER, THE HIsromcAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE JURY SYSTEM (1894); 1 F. PoLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWAIU I ch. 2 (2d ed. 1899); Thayer, The jury and Its Develop-
ment, 5 HARv. L. REV. 249, 295, 357 (1892); Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 5 HARv.
L. REv. 45 (1891).
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equals, and of the neighborhood, and men without just exception."0' 4
This classical form of the jury was not uniformly accepted throughout
the colonies; indeed, the individual contents of the various colonial
"parchment guarantees" were based upon widely differing local prac-
tices.65 Nevertheless, there was unquestionably an underlying accep-
tance by the early colonists of trial by jury as a fundamental precept of
liberty.66
Infringement by England upon what the colonists believed to be
their natural and common law right to trial by jury appears promi-
nently in the speeches and written remonstrances of the decade preced-
ing the American Revolution and thus must be included among its
precipitating causes. 67 Particularly obnoxious to the colonists was the
expansion of the commercial jurisdiction of British vice-admiralty
courts. Since the procedure in these courts accommodated the conti-
nental civil law which had no jury trial, every increase in their powers
meant a concomitant decrease of the colonists' access to trial by jury.68
In 1765 the Stamp Act Congress, composed of twenty-eight delegates
from nine colonies, promulgated a Declaration of Rights which pro-
claimed that
trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
subject in these colonies.
... [T]he [Stamp] act, and several other acts, by extend-
ing the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient
limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties
of the colonists. 69
64 5 CoNSrrrToNs 2580-81 (art. 19). See also id. at 2550-51 (chs. 19, 22) (N.J.); id. at
2781 (art. 69), 2785 (art. 111) (Carolina); id. at 2060 (art. 8) (Pa.); see HEu.ER 13-20; B.
LONG, GENESIS OF THE CoNSrTTUnON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA chs. 1-8 (1926);
R. RUT.AND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, ch. 2 (1955).
65 See generally HELLER 15-20; 1 H. OsGooD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVEN-
TENTH CENTURY 187-90 (1904); 2 id. at 303-06; P. REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMSON LAW IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES (1970); J. SMITH, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS
(1639-1702), at 143-45 (1961); Chitwvood, Justice in Colonial Virginia, 23 JOHNS HOPKINS U.
STUDIES IN HIST. & POL. Sci. 399 (1905); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 43, at 934-68;
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. RPv. 289, 320-26
(1966); Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 347
(1967); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170,
171-79 (1964).
66 See C. RossrrR, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TPADI-
TION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 142, 146, 276, 288-91, 407 (1953).
67 See, e.g., C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL .BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
125-37, 197-206 (1924); J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 286-87 (1959).
68 See Reid v. Covert, 254 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1957). See generally C. UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-
ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960).
69 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES 6 (W. Solberg ed. 1958).
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Further imperial trespasses upon claimed colonial rights-acts
such as the mandatory removal of colonists accused of treason to
England for trial-ultimately stimulated the meeting of the First
Continental Congress. In its Declaration and Resolves of October 14,
1774, the Congress asserted that "the respective colonies are entitled
to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage,
according to the course of that law."170 In the Declaration of Inde-
pendence itself, the colonial authors of the terminal break with the
mother country mention as one of England's transgressions that the
king "has combined with others... giving his Assent to their acts of
pretended Legislation: . . . For depriving us in many cases, of the
benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried
for pretended offenses .. . ."71 Indeed, insofar as political principles
influenced the development of the American Revolution, it appears that
concern over the deprivation of trial by jury played a strong supporting
role to "no taxation without representation." 72
Even prior to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence,
the colony of Virginia had adopted the first American bill of rights.73
Drafted by one of the architects of the Constitution, George Mason,
article 8 stated
[t]hat in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right
to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted
with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour,
70 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINErAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 69 (Library of Congress
ed. 1904-36) [hereinafter cited as JOURNALS]. Twelve days later, in a "Letter to the In-
habitants of the Province of Quebec," the Continental Congress expressed its empathy
with the Canadian colonists over the deprivation of their right to jury trial under the
Quebec Act of June 1774. Id. at 107; see also id. at 90, 93, 99.
71 Extension of British admiralty jurisdiction and the unprecedented removal to
England of treason cases, both decried in the Declaration of Independence, had also pre-
viously been enumerated in the Declaration on Taking Arms passed on July 6, 1775, by
the Second Continental Congress subsequent to the battles of Lexington and Concord. 2
JOURNALS 132, 145.
72 The relationship of trial by jury to the principle of democracy was aptly charac-
terized by Samuel Adams:
The two main provisions by which a certain share in the government is se-
cured to the people are their Parliaments and their juries; by the former of
which no laws can be made without their consent, and by the latter none can
be executed without their judgment.
1 W. WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAMUEL ADAMS 21 (1865). See R. MoRRs,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 484 (1957).
73 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1764-1788, AND
THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CONsrrrUTION 149-51 (S. Morison ed. 1929) [hereinafter
cited as SOURCES]. See generally H. GRuGSBY, THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1776 (1855);
Anderson, Jefferson and the Virginia Constitution, 21 Am. H r. REv. 750 (1916).
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and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without
whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he
be compelled to give evidence against himself .... 74
Commencement of the Revolution and the formal declaration of
independence initiated a spate of constitution making by the remainder
of the newly formed American republics, most of which in some fashion
similarly guaranteed the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. 75 With-
out question, these early state constitutional provisions--especially the
Virginia bill of rights-exercised significant influence upon the framers
of the guaranties of criminal jury trial incorporated into the federal
Constitution.76
Nowhere in the Articles of Confederation7 7 is the right to trial
by jury in criminal cases mentioned. The reports of the debates in
the Continental Congress are extremely cursory, and there is no in-
dication that the jury issue was ever even raised. On the other hand,
the concern of the Congress at that time was focused not upon threats
to personal freedoms, but upon the exigencies of uniting the newly
liberated states in the face of an armed conflict with England. Further-
more, there was little occasion or reason for the Continental Congress
to consider the mode of trial in criminal cases because, except for the
trial of piracy and felonies committed on the high seas, 78 the federal
judicial power created under the Articles of Confederation extended
only to civil cases.79
A committee appointed to formulate amendments to the Articles
did recommend in 1786 that a provision be inserted to declare that
"the trial of a fact by Jury shall ever be held sacred." 80 The proposals
74 Soucms 150 (emphasis added).
75 E.g., 2 CONSrTruTioNs 783, 785 (arts. 40-48, 61) (Ga.); 3 id. at 1686, 1688 (arts. 3,
19) (Md.); id. at 1891 (art. 12) (Mass.); 4 id. at 2455, 2456 (arts. 15-16, 21) (N.H.); 5 id. at
2598 (art. 22) (NJ.); id. at 2637 (art. 41) (N.Y.); id. at 2787 (art. 9) (N.C.); id. at 3083 (art.
9), 3088 (§ 25) (Pa.); 6 id. at 3257 (art. 41) (S.C.); id. at 3741 (art. 10), 3753 (art. 11) (Vt.);
see 1 id. at 569 (art. 1, § 4) (Del.); 2 id. at 789 (art. 4, § 3) (Ga.); 4 id. at 2473 (arts. 15-16)
(N.H.); 5 id. at 3100-01 (art. 9, § 10) (Pa.); 6 id. at 3264 (art. 9, §§ 2, 6) (S.C.); id. at 3763
(art. 10) (Vt.); cf. id. at 8223 (art. 1, § 10) (R-I.); 1 id. at 538 (art. 1, §§ 9, 21) (Conn.). See
also 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADis 226 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851); B. HAINES & C. HAINES, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF AccouNT OF ITS GROWTH AND MEANING 57-62
(1928); HELLER 22-24; H. HocaErr, THE CONS~rruTno AL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1776-1826: THE BLESSINGS OF LBERTY 113-20 (1939).
76 See E. DUmBAJL, THE BILL. OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 10-38, 50-56,
160-65 (1957) [hereinafter cited as BILL oF RIGHTS].
77 Adopted November 15, 1777. 9 JouRNALs 907-28.
78 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 265-66 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
79 9 JouRNArs 915-19 (art. 9).
80 31 id. at 497. This proposal, however, probably related to the civil, not the crim-
inal, jury.
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of this committee, however, were never acted upon by the Congress.
Nevertheless, in its regular legislative enactments, the Confederation
Congress did exhibit the traditional American reverence for trial by
jury. In 1787 it passed the Northwest Ordinance, a statute for the
governance of America's first frontier territory.81 Article 2 of that law
prescribed that
[t]he Inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to
the benefits of ... trial by Jury; . . . no man shall be deprived
of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the
law of the land .... 82
Coming as it did in the same year as the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, the Northwest Ordinance probably reflected accurately not
only the general esteem in which the jury was held at that time, but
also the particular cultural and intellectual baggage of the framers
of the Constitution itself.8 3
81 See generally J. BARREr, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 (1891).
82 32 JOURNALS 340. The forerunner of this particular provision was a guaranty of
trial by jury to all new purchasers of land in the Northwest Territory as proposed by a
committee report in September 1786. 31 id. at 670.
83 See Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 918, 920 (1964).
The Confederation period (1777-1789) has seldom been treated by historians as an end
unto itself; rather, it has been viewed as either an aftermath of the Revolution or a pre-
cursor of the Constitutional period. Johnson, Toward a Reappraisal of the "Federal"
Government: 1783-1789, 8 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 314 (1964); Morris, The Confederation Pe-
riod and the American Historian, 13 WM. & MARY Q. 139 (3d ser. 1956). This "interlude"
approach to the Confederation period dominates most of the general historical works
which in part treat the colonial-Constitutional period (e.g., 3 E. CHANNING, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1912); 1 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION AND ADoP-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES bk. 3 (1865); FROM THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE TO THE CONsrrrUTION (C. Friedrich & R. McCloskey eds. 1954); H. HOCEETT,
supra note 75, chs. 8-10; R. SCHUYLER, THE CoNsTrruTIoN OF THE UNrrED STATES: AN His-
TORICAL SURVEY OF ITS FORMATION chs. 1-2 (1923); 1 H. VON HOLsr, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 1 (1876)), as it does those pieces dealing
more specifically with the background and framing of the Constitution (e.g., F. DONOVAN,
MR. MADISON'S CONSTITUTION: THE STORY BEHIND THE CONSTrTUTIONAL CONVENTION ch. 1
(1965); B. HAINES & C. HAINES, supra note 75, pt. 1, chs. 4-6; M. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 21-27 (1964); A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANn-
FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. 1 (1964); E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE RIEPUBLIC,
1763-89 chs. 7-9 (1956); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSITUTION ch. 1 (1937) [here-
inafter cited as WARREN]; but see I G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORIATION OF THE
CONSFITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMmRCA (1882)). Similarly, even those works which
focus upon the era of the Confederation itself emphasize its relationship to the preceding
Revolutionary period or the succeeding Constitutional period. E.g., J. FisKE, THE CRICAL
PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-1789 (1888); M. JENSEN, THE NEw NATION-A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789 (1950); B. WRIGHT, CONSEN-
SUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787 (1958); Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory
Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, 30 AM. HIsT. REv. 511 (1925).
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B. Military Justice
Familiarity with the art and ways of war was also a prominent part
of the cultural heritage of the architects of the Constitution. All the
original colonial grants and charters had either explicitly or implicitly
authorized the formation of local defense establishments to meet the
exigencies of a hostile and dangerous habitation in the New World."
In response to such authorizations, the individual colonies had en-
acted universal military training laws 5 and rudimentary articles of
war.80 Organizational and operational control of these earliest militia
bodies was shared among the militia commanders, the colonial legis-
latures, and the royal governors.87 Consequently, many of the colonists
not only tasted the regimentation and discomfort of military service,
but some also experienced the demands and responsibilities of military
leadership.88 Although initially eager and locally effective, the in-
digenous militia forces were too poorly trained and amateurishly led
to conduct anything more than sporadic, defensive Indian engage-
ments.89
But the colonists were not left totally to their own devices in
military matters; even in the early stages of the colonial period, British
regular troops had frequented the North American shores. For exam-
84 See, e.g., 1 CONSTITUTIONS 534 (Conn.); 2 id. at 776 (Ga.); 3 id. at 1650 (Me.); id.
at 1682 (art. 12) (Md.); id. at 1835-36 (New England); id. at 1858 (Mass.); 4 id. at 2448
(Conn.); 5 id. at 2539, 2576 (art. 7) (N.J.); id. at 2751 (art. 15) (Carolina); 6 id. at 3209
(art. 18) (R.I.); 7 id. at 3784 (Va.). See also 1 H. OscooD, supra note 65, at 496-526; 2 id.
at 375-400,
85 See generally R. Duruy, A CoMPACr HIsToR OF Tm UNITED STATES ARmY 17-20
(rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as DuPuY]; J. HILL, THE MINUTEMAN IN PEACE AND WAR:
A HISORY OF rTHE NATiONAL GuARo 3-4 (1964); F. STERN, Tim CITIEN ARmY: KEY TO DE-
FENSE IN THE AToMic AGE 132-36 (1957); R. WEIGLEY, IsTORY oF THE UNITED STATES
Aimu ch. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WEIGLEY]; Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects
of the Militia, 26 YALE LJ. 471 (1917); Clendenen, A Little Known Period of American
Military History, 19 MI.. ArFAIas 37 (1955); Radabaugh, The Militia of Colonial Massa-
chusetts, 18 Mm. AFEAIRs 1 (1954); Sharp, Leadership and Democracy in the Early New
England System of Defense, 50 AM. HIST. REv. 244 (1945). The colonial militia systems
were modeled after their British forebears even though by this time England had moved
from any measurable reliance upon its militia forces towards a paid, professional army.
WEIGLEY 3-4.
86 1 CoNSTrunoNs 534 (Conn.); 2 id. at 776 (Ga.); 3 id. at 1630, 1639 (Me.); id. at
1682 (art. 18) (Md.); id. at 183 (New England); 4 id. at 2448 (Conn.); 5 id. at 2752 (art.
16), 2770 (Carolina); 6 id. 8218 (RI.). See 4 H. OsGooD, supra note 65, at 852.
87 WEIGLEY ch. 1.
88 See Sharp, supra note 85.
89 See, e.g., DuPuY 20-21; D. LEACH, FLINTLOCK AND TOMAHAWK: NEW ENGLAND IN
KING PHiL's WAR (1958). An additional factor was the unavailability of the militia units
for duty outside their respective colonies without the authorization of their colonial
legislature.
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ple, a contingent of regulars was continuously garrisoned in New York
from 1664 to the Revolution." From time to time, public courts-
martial were convened by the commanders of these British units and in
some cases such courts were even conducted under the authority of
statutes passed by the colonial legislatures. 91 Owing perhaps to the
spectacle of such courts-martial or perhaps to their inherited distrust
of standing armies, the American colonists bore no good will towards
British military justice. The New York Charter of Liberties and
Privileges of 1683, for example, specifically prohibited the crown com-
missioners from proceeding "by Marshall Law against any of his
Majestyes Subjects" who were civilians.92
With the advent of the French and Indian War (1754-1763),
familiarity with the British articles of war became for many a very
personal matter. To satisfy their need for a more competent and stable
colonial military force, the British had authorized their royal gov-
ernors to issue commissions for the recruitment of colonial volunteers.
Numerous such regiments were in fact raised in North America and
organized as quasi-regular British units. As such, they were directly
subject to British discipline in arms and British military justice.93
Many colonists were similarly recruited to serve with the British naval
forces during this period and were consequently in immediate con-
tact with England's system of naval justice. 94
90 Pargellis, The Four Independent Companies of New York, in ESSAYs IN COLONIAL
HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHARLES McLEAN ANDREWS BY HIs STUDENTS 96 (L. Labaree ed.
1931). See also J. SHY, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BrrISH ARMY IN THE COM-
ING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20-44 (1965).
91 See J. SHY, supra note 90, at 163-85; Leder, "Dam'me Don't Stir a Man"--Trial of
New York Mutineers in 1700, 42 N.Y. Hsr. Soc. Q. 261 (1958).
92 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 114
(N.Y. Comm'n of Statutory Revision ed. 1894).
93 See DuPuY 22-24; 4 H. OsGooD, supra note 65, at 386-88, 402-10 (1924); WEIGLEY
ch. 2; F. WIENER, supra note 15, at 37-63; Todd, Our National Guard: An Introduction
to Its History, 5 MIL. AFFAIRs 73 (1941). The volunteer units also saw service under the
British in putting down the Indian rebellion of 1763-1765 led by Chief Pontiac of the
Ottawas. See generally F. PARKMAN, HISTORY OF THE CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC (1885); H.
PECKHAM, PONTIAC AND THE INDIAN UPRISING (1947). In 1765, the British Articles of War
were specifically made applicable to colonial troop units raised in America:
The Officers and Soldiers of any Troops which are or shall be raised in Amer-
ica, being mustered and in Pay, shall, at all Times, and in all Places, when joined,
or acting in Conjunction with Our British Forces, be governed by these Rules
or Articles of War, and shall be subject to be tried by Courts-martial in like
Manner with the Officers and Soldiers of Our British Troops.
WINTHROP 946 (emphasis in original). See also F. WIENER, supra note 15, at 68.
94 J. SNEDEKER, A BR HISTORY OF COURTS-MARTIAL 50 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
SNEDEKER]; Williams, On the History of Discipline in the Navy, 45 U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc.
355, 358 (1919). Prior to the Revolutionary War, there existed no indigenous Americah
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Exposure to the British military establishment apparently did
nothing to endear England or her armed forces to the colonists. In
particular, military enforcement of unpopular commercial legislation
and frequent declarations of martial law by the royal governors in-
flamed the colonists and stimulated their desire for political severance
from England.95 For example, the First Continental Congress asserted
in its Declaration and Resolves of 1774 that "the keeping a Standing
army in these colonies, in times of peace, without the consent -of the
legislature of that colony, in which such army is kept, is against
law." 96 Similarly, the Second Continental Congress listed as a promi-
nent grievance the allegedly unwarranted declaration by the British
of martial law in the city of Boston.97 Finally, the Declaration of In-
dependence, which accused King George III of numerous "injuries
and usurpations," specifically emphasized that "[h]e has kept among
us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
Legislature [and] has affected to render the Military independent of
and superior to the Civil Power." Although primary emphasis in these
and other Revolutionary remonstrances was placed upon the desired
general political supremacy of the civil authority over the military,
the underlying reasons for the abhorrence of British military authority
must certainly have included an awareness of the military's propensity
to supersede the civil justice system.98
As the colonies began to mobilize at the outbreak of the Revolu-
tion, however, the issue of domestic standing armies was rendered
moot. The Second Continental Congress took over the combined war
efforts of the states in June 1775. One of its first acts was to appoint
a committee, of which George Washington was a prominent member,
to prepare "Rules and regulations for the government of the army."99
Using the British and colonial articles of war as models, the com-
mittee reported out a bill which became the basis of the first American
navy, even on a militia basis. See generally E. MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AsmcAN PRIVA-
Trans (1899); C. PAULLIN, Tni NAvy OF THE AMERCAN RzVOLUTION: ITS ADMINISTRATION,
ITS POLICY, AND ITS ACIHEVmEMNTS (1906),
95 See notes 66-68 supra.
98 1 JOURNALS 63, 70. Concern over British maintenance of a colonial standing army
was also expressed by the First Continental Congress in its "Memorial to the Inhabitants
of the British Colonies," October 21, 1774. Id. at 90, 93.
97 2 id. at 152. See note 71 supra.
98 In 1774 Thomas Jefferson wrote that "[e]very state must judge for itself the num-
ber of armed men which they may safely trust among them, of whom they are to consist,
and under what restrictions they shall be laid." 1 THE WRNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
445 (P. Ford ed. 1892). See PAMPHLErs OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION, 1750-1776, at 41-43,
71-74 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965).
99 2 JOURNALS 90.
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Articles of War.100 In November a different committee, appointed to
obtain and fit out four new naval vessels, proposed a set of rules for
the regulation of the projected American navy.101 These proposals
were adopted by the Congress as the first Rules for the Regulation
of the Navy of the United States.102
John Adams, a member of the naval committee, had adapted the
rules primarily from the British Naval Discipline Acts of 1661 and
1749103 and the Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's
Service at Sea of 1772.'0 Adams was also a key figure in a 1776 redraft-
ing of the 1775 Army Articles of War.0 5 In an illuminating passage
written years later, Adams candidly stated,
[S]o undigested were the notions of liberty prevalent among the
majority of the members most zealously attached to the public
cause, that to this day I scarcely know how it was possible that
these articles could have been carried. They were adopted, how-
ever, and have governed our armies with little variation to this
day.106
Adams's statement surely indicates an awareness on the part of the
major participants in the Revolutionary War of the inherent antag-
onism between a separate system of military justice and the political
liberties for which they were fighting.
The Continental Army and Navy were governed by the regula-
tions of 1775 and 1776 for the duration of the war. 07 Contemporary
100 Id. at 110-11. The full Articles appear in id. at 111-23. These provisions were
based essentially on earlier British Articles of War (WINTHROP 931) and the Massachusetts
Articles of War of the previous April (id. at 947). See generally W. AYcoCK & S. WuRFEL,
MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUsTICE 9-10 (1955); SNEDE RER 20;
J. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 28 (1953); WINTHROP 21-22.
Several minor amendments to the 1775 Articles of War were passed on November 7,
1775, and the Articles as amended were published and distributed to the field on No-
vember 13, 1775. 3 JOURNALS 331-34, 352. The 1775 Articles authorized two levels of
Army courts-martial, the general court and the regimental or garrison court. The former
was composed of 13 officers and the latter of five. Court members were appointed by the
commander who convened the court, and such members served as both judge and jury.
Verdicts and sentences of all courts were settled by majority vote. Clearly the Army
court-martial of 1775 was not modeled upon the classical common law jury.
101 3 JOURNALS 364.
102 Id. at 375-76, 378, 393. The composition and structure of naval courts-martial
were essentially identical to the Army's, with the exception that only one level of court-
martial, a general court composed of 12 officers, was authorized.
103 22 Geo. 2, c.33.
104 SNEDEKER 49-50; DeVico, Evolution of Military Law, 21 JAG J. 63, 65 (1966-
67).
105 See 5 JOURNALS 442, 636, 670-71, 764, 788-807.
106 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 75, at 83-84.
107 Several minor amendments were made during the Revolutionary War to the
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sources indicate that courts-martial were indeed conducted pursuant
to those regulations"8 and that the members of the Continental Con-
gress were fully cognizant of such proceedings. 10 9 Courts-martial such
as the spying trial of Major Andr 1°0 and the 1781 trial and summary
execution of the New Jersey mutineers"' received considerable public
notoriety. The Continental Congress itself became deeply involved in
the day-to-day operations of the war" 2 and occasionally even directed
the court-martial of members of the Continental Army and Navy.'13
In particular, the problem of widespread desertion from the Conti-
nental Army and colonial militia forces kept the Congress's attention
focused on disciplinary matters." 4 In short, the leaders and participants
Army Articles of War of 1776. See, e.g., 7 JouRNALs 13, 250, 264-66. A significant alteration
in the 1775 Articles for the Government of the Navy, however, was approved by the
Continental Congress on June 2, 1782. In addition to authorizing any Navy captain to
convene courts-martial for the trial of other than commissioned officers, the Congress
provided that
for the future, a marine court of enquiry or court-martial for enquiring into
or trying of all capital cases, shall consist of at least five commissioned navy and
marine officers, two of whom shall be captains, and in all cases not capital it
shall consist of three such officers, one of whom shall be a captain in the navy
of the United States.
22 id. at 325. See generally Sargent, The Evolution of Courts-Martial, 9 U.S. NAvAL INsT.
PRoc. 693, 706-07 (1883).
108 See Dupuy 29; W. GANOE, THE HIsrORY OF THE UNrran STATES ARMy 16-17
(1924); 2 NAVAL DocuMENTs Or THE AMEmCAN REVOLUTION 175, 186, 201, 209, 1169 (W.
Clark ed. 1966); WEIGLEY 63; WINTHROP 59 & nn.10-14; Maurer, Military Justice Under
Washington, 28 Mu.. AFMARS 8 (1964). The British also held numerous courts-martial
during the Revolutionary War. See, e.g., 2 NAvAL DocuM~mrs or Tm AasmICAN REVOLU-
TION, supra at 31, 54, 55, 75-76, 84-85, 118, 189, 210, 264-65, 334-36, 371, 457; see also
Brown, The Court Martial of Lord George Sackville, Whipping Boy of the Revolutionary
War, 9 WM. & MARY Q. 317 (3d ser. 1952). Without question, these British military trials
were well known to the American revolutionaries since many of them were conducted
in colonial cities and involved colonial citizens. See F. WiaNma, supra note 15, chs. 5-6.
109 E.g., 5 JouRNAL-s 626; 9 id. at 783.
110 See note 4 supra.
111 See DueuY 37; C. VAN DOREN, MUTINY IN JANUARY (1943); WEIGLEY 59.
112 See SNEDERER 50; WRicLEY 30, 45-49.
113 E.g., on July 30, 1776, in response to a committee report on military miscarriages
in Canada against the British, the Congress resolved:
That Colonel Bedel be tried by a court martial for leaving his command at
the Cedars, and for declining to return to the same with Major Sherburne's rein-
forcement:
That Major Butterfield be tried by a court martial for surrendering to the
enemy the post at the Cedars, and also such other officers as were with him, and
consented to that surrender.
5 JouRNALs 618. See also 16 id. at 139-40 (court of inquiry for loss of naval vessel);
WINTHROP 59 & n.10.
114 M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-
CONsTrUTiONAL HISTORY OF Trm AmRICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 171-72 (1940).
Until Baron Frederick von Steuben offered his services to the Continental Army and
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in the American Revolution were no strangers to the articles of war
and the court-martial.
Although the Army Articles of War of 1775 and 1776 and the
Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of 1775 were undoubtedly en-
acted with the acquiescence of the colonies, the Continental Congress
did not acquire formal authorization for such legislation until the
Articles of Confederation were passed in 1777. Article 9 of the Articles
of Confederation, adopted without recorded debate," 5 granted the
Congress the power of "making rules for the government and regula,
tion of the said land and naval forces."'1 6 The Confederation Congress
exercised its authority under article 9 at least once, although it was
after the conclusion of the war, when it amended the 1776 Army Arti-
cles of War.117 These 1786 amendments are significant because they
specifically dealt with the structure and procedure of courts-martial
and therefore manifeste4i the Congress's continuing concern and
familiarity with military justice.""
until his Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States
were adopted by the Continental Congress in 1779 (13 JouRNALs 384-85), the organiza-
tion and training of the American forces was in such a deplorable state that only heavy
doses of harsh and summary punishment were considered effective to maintain discipline.
Mummey, A Brief History of Summary Punishment in the Armies of the World, 15
FEn. B.J. 286, 302-03 (1955); note 108 supra.
115 9 JouRaNAIs 919. Portions of article 14 of the Committee of the Whole's draft had
been variously debated and passed throughout October 1777. Id. at 803-06, 834-41, 844-46,
848-50. The Committee on Arrangement redesignated the amended article 14 as article 9
in the final version. Id. at 919.
316 Id. In Benjamin Franklin's earlier proposal Congress had been given power over
"the Regulation of our common Forces." 2 id. at 196.
117 30 id. at 316-22.
118 The 1786 amendments were precipitated primarily by several notorious con-
sequences of the post-Revolutionary War demobilization. After successful prosecution of
the war and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the new nation immediately began
to disband its forces. The Navy was virtually extinguished by 1785. SNEDEKMR 51. The
Continental Army was reduced by 1784 to a force of 80 enlisted men and several officers.
27 JOURNALS 524. In June of 1784, several hundred militiamen were requisitioned from
the states for garrison duty on the western frontier. 28 JOURNALs 247-48; J. JACoBS, THE
BEGINNING OF THE US. ARMY, 1783-1812, at 16-18 (1947). Although the authorized size of
the regular Army was also increased in 1786-87 to 1,340 men (30 JOURNALs 226-27; 33 id.
at 602-03), the number of troops actually serving on duty remained consistently lower.
Desertion had continued to plague the Army even after the cessation of hostilities with
the British. Faced with a high desertion rate and confronted with an understaffing of
officers, a frontier commander at Fort McIntosh in 1786 convened a general court-martial
composed of only five officers. This action contravened article I, section 14 of the Articles
of War of 1776 which required the appointment of 13 officers on all general courts. 5 id.
at 800. Two men were convicted of desertion by this illegal court and sentenced to death.
30 id. at 119-21; see SNEDEKER 20-21. Although the Congress was distressed by the Fort
McIntosh incident, it also recognized the plight of the small, detached command. In fact,
this incident appears to have been a stimulus to the 1786 amendments to the Army
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On the other hand, one year later the Confederation Congress
also exhibited the traditional Anglo-American concern with civilian
supremacy over the military. At the suggestion of Secretary of War
Henry Knox,1 9 a congressional committee had recommended in 1787
that until the civil government prescribed by the Northwest Ordinance
had established itself, all persons in the Northwest Territory who
caused injury to the Indians or otherwise breached the treaty with
them should be tried and punished by martial law "in the same man-
ner as the soldiers in the actual service of the United States."' 20 This
recommendation and others like it, however, were never acted upon
by the Congress; 121 the Confederation Congress, although recognizing
the necessity and propriety of a separate judicial system for the military,
apparently preferred to maintain the supremacy of civil institutions in
all but strictly military matters.
Military policy and military justice under the Confederation were
not solely the province of the federal government. Article 6 of the
Articles of Confederation expressly perpetuated the practice of each
state maintaining its own militia. 22 The Continental Congress itself,
although somewhat unwillingly, relied quite heavily upon the state
militia units in the prosecution of the Revolutionary War.123 These
units, when acting alone in their local defense capacity, were often
governed by their own individual articles of war. In fact, the states
preceded the Continental Congress in adopting articles of war at the
outbreak of hostilities with England. The Massachusetts Articles of
War of April 1775 even served as a model for the first federal arti-
des. 24 Although the states made numerous accommodations in their
militia laws and practices to the principles of democracy,2 5 court-
Articles of War. One of the significant procedural alterations made by these amendments,
for example, was the reduction of the general court-martial quorum from 13 to five and
of the regimental/garrison court quorum from five to three. 30 JoURNALS 145.
119 32 id. at 327-32.
120 33 id. at 411.
121 33 id. at 385. See generally F. WIEN R, supra note 15, at 68-69.
122 "[B]ut every State shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia,
sufficiently armed and accoutred ...." 9 JouRNALs 912. This provision was debated and
passed by the Congress on October 23, 1777, without recorded objection. Id. at 834.
123 See, e.g., DuPuY ch. 2; J. HImL, supra note 85, at 5-7; F. STERN, supra note 85,
at 132-36; WEIGULY chs. 3-4; Murphy, The American Revolutionary Army and the Con-
cept of Levee en Masse, 23 MIL. AFFAIRs 13 (1959); Shaw, The Interrelationship of the
United States Army and the National Guard, 31 MIL. L. REv. 39, 4041 (1966).
124 W. Aycoclc & S. WuRFEL, supra note 100, at 9; SNEoEKR 20; Wixrmnop 22. In
addition to Massachusetts, at least Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Carolina also passed local articles of war for the governance of their
militia forces. Id. at 22 & n-32.
125 E.g., providing for the election of officers.
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martial substance and procedure conformed essentially to that of the
Continental Army and, for that matter, the British Army.1 26 Military
justice was not, however, totally immunized from civilian jurispru-
dence. In the states' insistence that militiamen in national service be
tried by courts-martial composed only of militia officers from their
own state,u 7 for example, one may clearly discern an analogy to the
civilian tradition of drawing the jury from the vicinage. While
acknowledging the special role that a court-martial played in relation
to military discipline, the colonists also indicated by this demand an
apparent recognition of the court-martial as a genuine judicial institu-
tion.
In their various constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1787,
the states effectively ratified their previous enactment of revolutionary
articles of war and also provided for the future regulation of their
militia forces. 2 On the other hand, the states in their early constitu-
tions also recognized the inherent conflict between civilian and
military justice. Several provisions of the New Hampshire bill of rights
of 1784 are particularly instructive in this regard:
Nor shall the legislature make any law that shall subject any per-
son to a capital punishment, excepting for the government of the
army and navy, and the militia in actual service, without trial byjury.
No person can in any case be subjected to law martial, or to
any pains, or penalties, by virtue of that law, except those em-
ployed in the army or navy, and except the militia in actual ser-
vice, but by authority of the legislature. 29
These sentiments and similar ones expressed in the other state bills
of rights and constitutions of this period 8 0 are lineal ancestors of the
126 The disciplinary laws of the states usually adopted the Articles of War of the
Continental Congress as their base and then engrafted local regulations thereon.
127 The Continental Congress apparently recognized this as an appropriate, or at
least significant, demand because a specific requirement to this effect was incorporated into
section 17, article 1, of the 1776 Articles of War. 5 JOURNALS 805.
128 See, e.g., N.H. CONsT. pt. II (1784):
The president ... shall have full power... to use and exercise over the army
and navy, and over the militia in actual service, the law-martial in time of
war, invasion, and also in rebellion, declared by the legislature to exist, as oc-
casion shall necessarily require ....
4 CONSTrUTONs 2463-64. See also 3 id. at 1901 (ch. 2, art. 7) (Mass.); 5 id. at 2637 (art. 40)
(N.Y.); 7 id. at 3817 (Va.).
129 4 id. at 2455 (art. 16), 2457 (art. 34).
-lao E.g., 3 id. 1688-89 (arts. 26-27, 29) (Md.); id. at 1892-93 (art. 17), 1901 (art. 7)
(Mass.); 5 id. at 2788 (art. 17) (N.C.); id. at 3083 (art. 13) (Pa.); 6 id. at 3257 (art. 42)
(S.C.); id. at 3741 (art. 15), 3753-54 (arts. 18-19) (Vt.); 7 id. at 3814 (art. 13) (Va.); see 1 id.
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military provisions of the federal Constitution of 1789 and Bill of
Rights of 1791.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
On May 14, 1787, the Constitutional Convention convened in
Philadelphia. Many of the delegates, including George Washington
himself, had either personally experienced military service in the
Revolutionary War and the subsequent frontier Indian wars or had
otherwise participated in the new nation's military affairs. 1' 1 The
goal of the convention was to revise the Articles of Confederation so
as to "render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of
Government and the preservation of the Union.' 32 The deficiencies
and inadequacies of the Confederation, especially in military matters,
were notorious.133 In particular, the recent eruption of Shay's Rebellion
in Massachusetts had thrust the weakness of the Confederation into
the national consciousness. 34 The primary task of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, therefore, was the creation of a strong and
viable national government. 135
at 568-69 (art. 1, § 8) (Del.); 4 id. at 2473-74 (arts. 16, 25-26) (N.H.); 5 id. at 3100 (art. 9,
§ 10) (Pa.); 6 id. at 3264 (art. 9, § 3) (S.C.); id. at 8764 (arts. 16-17) (Vt.); cf. 1 id. at 538
(art. 1, § 9) (Conn.); 6 id. at 3223 (art. 1, § 7) (R.I.).
131 See W. AYcocK & S. WURFEL, supra note 100, at 11.
132 32 JouRNALs 74; 3 THE RECORDS OF TiE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 14 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as REcoRos]. Citations throughout this article for the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 will be to REcoRDs because of that
work's utilization of the notes of all the known chroniclers of the Convention's debates:
Madison, King, Yates and Lansing, McHenry, Hamilton, Paterson, and Pierce.
133 See, e.g., C. RossrrER, 1787: THE GRAaN CONVENTION 41-57 (1966); THE FEDERALST
Nos. 2-5 (J. Jay), 6-9 (A. Hamilton), 18-20 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison), 23-26 (A. Hamilton);
Farrand, The Federal Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation, 2 AM. POL. Sci.
REv. 532 (1908).
134 See, e.g., D. CHmsEy, THE BIRTH OF THE CONsTUTION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY 23
(1964); 1 REcoRis 18, 406-07; 2 id. at 332; 8 id. at 547. But see 2 id. at 317. See generally
G. RIVERS, CAtAIN SHAys, A PoPULIS OF 1786 (1897); M. STARKEY, A LIrE REB.LITON
(1955); WmGLEY 84.
135 For detailed descriptions of the workings and results of the Constitutional Con-
vention, see G. BACON, THm CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOME OF ITS FUNDA-
MENTAL ASPECTS ch. 1 (1928); 2 G. BANCROFT, supra note 83, bk. 8; 1 G. CURTIS, supra
note 83, bk. 3, chs. 6-16; 2 id. bk. 4, chs. 1-16; F. DONOVAN, supra note 83, chs. 2-5 (1965);
E. DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 88-58; M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1913) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND]; B. HAINES & C. HAINES, SUpra
note 75, at 92-101; HI.ER 29-33; B. HENDRICK, BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC: A BIOcRAPHY
OF THE CONsrrION bk. 1 (1937); H. HocKcE-r, supra note 75, at 205-19; M. JENSEN, THE
MAKING oF THE AMERICAN CONsTrrunoN chs. 6-12 (1964); B. LONG, supra note 64, ch. 17; A.
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Much of the convention's time was consumed in debates over the
various military and war provisions of the Constitution.'3 6 Ultimately,
the delegates agreed that the proposed Congress was specifically to be
granted the powers to "declare War,"137 to "raise and support Armies"
and "provide and maintain a Navy,"' 38 to "grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal,"' 39 to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water,"'140 and to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law
of Nations."'141 The President was installed as the "Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy... and of the Militia... when called into
. . . actual Service."'142 As between the federal government and the
MASON, supra note 83, ch. 2; B. MrrcamrL & L. MITcnELL, A BIoGRAPHY o1 THE CONSrrrTrUON
OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS OIGIN, FORMATION, ADOPTION, INTERPRrATION ch. 3 (1964);
E. MORGAN, supra note 83, ch. 10; J. RooD, THE HISTORY OF BUILDING rH CoNSTrronoN OF
THE UNr ED STATES 1-15 (1948); R. RUT.AND, supra note 64, ch. 6; R. ScnumYaR, supra note
83, ch. 3; Brandy, Formation of the Federal Constitution, 6 So. L. REv. 352 (1880); Far-
rand, Compromises of the Constitution, 9 AM. HIST. REv. 479 (1904).
136 Notes 137-46 infra. See generally E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITruTION
(1947); J. RoRms, WoRLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION (1945); W. WITING, WAR
PoWEs UNDER Tnm CONSrrrTUON OF THE UNITED STATES (43d ed. 1871).
L7 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8. See 1 RECORDS 18-19, 24-25, 65-66, 139-40, 144, 146, 292,
300, 316, 326, 329; 2 id. at 143, 168, 182, 313, 318-20, 570, 595.
138 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See I RECORDS 285-87, 465; 2 id. at 143, 158, 168, 182, 323,
329-30, 333, 505-06, 508-09, 563, 570, 595, 616-17, 633, 635, 640. The dispute concerning
the congressional power to raise and support armed forces echoed the traditional English
controversy over the propriety of standing armies. E.g., 2 G. BANCROFT, supra note 83,
at 147; 2 G. CURTIS, supra note 83, at 333-34; Tm FEDERALISr Nos. 24-26 (A. Hamilton), 41
(J. Madison); WARREN 482-84.
'39 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See 2 REcoas 322, 326, 328, 505, 508, 570, 595.
140 US. CONST. art. I, § 8. See 1 RECORDS 22, 211; 2 id. at 143, 168, 182, 315, 320, 570,
595.
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See 2 RECORDS 143, 168, 182, 312, 315-16, 320, 570, 595,
614-15. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); United States v. Adhel, 43 US.
(2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24 US. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1826); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-62 (1820). See generally Dumbauld, John
Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 38 (1955).
142 US. CoNsr. art. II, § 2. See I RECORDS 65-66, 70, 244, 247, 292; 2 id. at 69-70, 145,
157-58, 172, 185, 422, 426, 575, 599, 621. See also 2 G. BANcROr, supra note 83, at 188; 2
G. CuRTIS, supra note 83, at 409-13; E. DtmuBAULD, supra note 61, at 279-81; THE
FEDERALIsr Nos. 69 & 74 (A. Hamilton); Hollander, The President and Congress-Opera-
tional Control of the Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REv. 49 (1965).
The Supreme Court has determined that solely by virtue of his constitutional posi-
tion as Commander-in-Chief, the President possesses the inherent power to convene-and
delegate to his subordinate commanders the power to convene-all courts-martial. Swaim
v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). The Constitutional authority of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to issue general regulations pertaining to military justice has been
consistently sustained by the Supreme Court. Id. at 565; Kurtz v. Mofflitt, 115 US. 487, 503
(1885); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879); see Gratiot v. United States, 45 US. (4
How.) 80, 117-18 (1846); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 567 (1845);
United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301 (1842); see also WINT1RtoP 27-33. Cur-
rently the President also possesses statutory authority to regulate courts-martial:
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states, the burdens and responsibilities of national defense were clearly
allotted by the convention to the former. In return for an agreement
not to "keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace" or to "engage
The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-marital,
courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be pre-
scribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practi-
cable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may
not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1970).
The Court of Military Appeals, however, has held that this power to promulgate
military justice regulations must not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the
Constitution or federal statutes relative to military justice, and has in fact invalidated
portions of the Presidential Manual for Courts-Martial (1951), which had been specifically
issued (Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1949-53 comp.)) under its authority. United
States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v. Simpson, 10
US.C.MA. 229, 27 C.M.R. 303 (1959); United States v. Smith, 10 US.C.MA. 152, 27
C.M.R. 227 (1959). See generally Fedele, The Manual for Courts-Martial-Its Legal Status
and the Effect of Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 23 FoazHAm
L Rv. 323 (1954); Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical
Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1959); Green-
berg, Introduction to the Unofficial Changes to MCM, 1951, 15 JAG J. 98 (1961); Murphy,
Manual for Courts-Martial: Modification by the Court of Military Appeals, JAG J. Feb.
1956, at 3; Comment, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64
CoLum. L. RV. 127, 137-39 (1964).
In particular, the Court of Military Appeals has clearly stated that the President's
constitutional powers do not extend to the creation of substantive military crimes:
Nor is there any basis for the proposition that the President may create an
offense under the Code. To the contrary, our forefathers reposed in the Congress
alone the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces." . . . The President's power as Commander-in-Chief
does not embody legislative authority to provide crimes and offenses.
United States v. McCormick, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 28, 80 C.M.R. 26, 28 (1960), quoting US.
CoNST. art. 1, § 8. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1957). On the other hand, in re-
gard to one category of substantive crimes, the court has seemingly looked with favor upon
Presidential exercise of quasi-legislative power. Article 134 of the UCMJ, the "general
article," states,
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). In its decisions determining the sufficiency of particular allegations
of an offense under this language, the court has tacitly accepted the President's power to
legislate in the area by giving great weight to whether or not the President had already
defined the crime by prescribing a form specification and a maximum punishment.
See, e.g., United States v. Kirskey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955); United States
v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 14 C.M.R. 38 (1954); United States v. Blue, 3 U.S.C.M.A.
550, 13 C.M.R. 106 (1953); United States v. Patrick, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 189, 7 C.M.R. 65 (1953);
United States v. Kirchner, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 4 C.M.R. 69 (1952); see also United States v.
Frantz, 2 US.C.MA. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953); cf. Jaekley, 4 C.M.R. (A.F.) 130, 138
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in War, unless actually invaded"' 43 and not to "grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal,"'144 the states bound the federal government to
guarantee them "a Republican Form of Government" and to guard
them "against Invasion; and ... domestic Violence."'145
Congress's formal power to promulgate articles of war and to
establish a system of courts-martial derives, however, not from these
provisions, but from its power "To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."'146 This clause was in-
(1950) (A.C.M. 2927); Deese, 3 C.M.R. (A.F.) 307 (1950) (A.C.M. 2693). See generally Ackroyd,
The General Articles, Article 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 35
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 264 (1961); Castro, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman,
JAG J., June 1949, at 10; id., July 1949, at 14; Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. REv. 142 (1959); Gaynor, Prejudicial
and Discreditable Military Conduct: A Critical Appraisal of the General Article, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 259 (1971); Hagan, The General Article-Elemental Confusion, 10 MIL. L.
REv. 63 (1960); Lewis, Limitations Upon Prosecution of Offenses Under Article 134, 9
A.F. JAG L. REv. 35 (1967); Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private Life, 24 MIL. L.
REv. 97 (1964); Nichols, The Devil's Article, 22 MIL. L. REv. 111 (1963); Comment,
Military Personnel and the First Amendment: "Discreditable Conduct" as a Standard for
Restricting Political Activity, 65 YALE L.J. 1207 (1956).
143 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10. See I REcoRDs 293; 2 id. at 135, 169, 187, 437, 443, 577, 597,
625-26.
244 US. CoNsr. art. I, § 10. See 2 REcoRDs 169, 187, 437, 443, 577, 597.
145 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. See 1 RECORDS 22, 28, 193-94, 202, 206, 227, 231, 237; 2
id. at 39, 47-49, 133, 144, 148, 151, 159, 168, 174, 182, 188, 459-61, 466-67, 470, 578, 602;
3 id. at 630; 4 id. at 45, 49. See generally Georgia v. Stanton, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article
IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
146 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8. The President, Congress, and military commanders have
often resorted to the use of "military commissions" which have not been classified
technically as courts-martial and have not derived their authorization from the Con-
gressional power to prescribe rules for the land and naval forces. Their use has instead
been justified as an exercise of the other federal war powers previously described. However,
although not usually dealing with military personnel or military offenses, military com-
missions have generally utilized the form, procedure, and even substantive law of the
court-martial system. See S. -BENkr, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
COURTS-MARTIAL 203-14 (6th ed. 1868); G. TREADwELL, MILITARY COURTS MANUAL 1-14 (1945);
F. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw 6-15 (1940); WuT'usmop 831-46; Fairman,
Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REav. 587 (1949);
Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1948): Halleck, Military Tribunals
and Their Jurisdiction, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 958 (1911); Kaplan, Constitutional Limitations on
Trials by Military Commissions, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1943), 272 (1944). One appropriate
instance for the use of the military commission is in conjunction with a declaration of mar-
tial law, i.e., the temporary military preemption of a domestic civil government in the face
of external invasion, internal revolt, or natural disaster. See generally J. ANTHONY, HAwAI
UNDER ARMY RULE (1955); W. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOvERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (3d
rev. ed. 1914); C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943); B. RICH, THE
PRESIDENTS AND CIvIL DISORDER 208-12 (1941); W. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY: A HISTORY
OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 583-419 (1941); G. TaDAI-
wELL, supra at 10-12; D. WALKER, MLTARY LAw 474-502 (1954); F. WItENE, supra; F.
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cluded in none of the basic plans submitted to the convention. The
first specific mention of it in the recorded proceedings was on August
18, 1787, when the provision was suggested in a floor debate as an
amendment to the report of the Committee of Detail: "'To make
rules for the Government and regulation of the land & naval forces,'--
added from the existing Articles of Confederation."' 47 This provision
was ultimately adopted by the convention without further debate or
change. 148
That the intent of this provision was to authorize legislation
relating to military justice is persuasively evidenced by a draft of
the Committee of Detail in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph.
One of the "legislative powers" enumerated in this draft (which never
reached the convention floor) had been the power "To enact articles
WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DoMESTc DISTURBANCES 1903-1922, S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1922); WINTHROP 817-30; Civil Defense, Army Reg. 500-70 (1965); Civil Distur-
bances, Army Reg. 500-50 (1969); Civil Disturbances and Disasters, Dep't Army Field
Manual 19-15 (1968); Fairman, Martial Law and the Suppression of Insurrection, 23 ILL.
L REV. 766 (1929); Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered, 18 L.Q. REv. 117
(1902); Pollock, What is Martial Law?, 18 L.Q. REv. 152 (1902); Richards, Martial Law,
18 L.Q. Rev. 133 (1902); Whitford, Martial Law and Habeus Corpus, JAG J., June 1948, at
4; Wiener, Martial Law Today, 55 A.B.A.J. 723 (1969).
Another proper occasion for the use of the military commission is as an adjunct to
the operation of a military government, i.e., the total military control of the organs of
civil government characteristic of an army of occupation in a foreign territory. See gen-
erally W. BIRHMmER, supra; G. DAvIs, supra note 100, at 300-13; G. TREAMELL, supra
at 2-5, 14-60; D. WAatm, supra at 502-19; F. WIENER, supra note 15, at 92-159; WINTmROP
798-817, 846-56; Civil Affairs Operations, Dep't Army Field Manual 41-10 (1969); Ferrari,
Military Courts of Paris, 9 J. Ams. INsT. Cram. L. & CRISMNOLOGY 5 (1918); 2 International
Law, Dep't Army Pamphlet 27-161-2, at 169-73 (1962); Joint Manual for Civil Affairs,
Dep't Army Field Manual 41-5 (1966); Nobleman, American Military Government Courts
in Germany, 267 ANNALS 87 (Jan. 1950); The Law of Land Warfare, Dep't Army Field
Manual 27-10, at 158-64 (1956).
Creation of military tribunals for the trial of war criminals is another example of
the constitutional exercise of this quasi-court-martial jurisdiction. See generally J.
AppmLEAN, MILrrARY TRmUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CamsEs (1954); G. TREADwELL, supra
at 6-10, 105-10; D. WALyER, supra at 520-74; 2 International Law, supra at 221-51; The
Law of Land Warfare, supra at 176-83; notes 3 & 11 supra. Military commissions have
also been legitimately convened for the trial of enemy spies and saboteurs. See generally
2 International Law, supra at 57-64; Kaplan, supra; The Law of Land Warfare, supra
at 31-34; Warren, Spies and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes of Civilians
to Trial by Military Tribunals, 53 Am. L. REv. 195 (1919). Finally, the military com-
mision has customarily provided the forum for the trial of enemy prisoners of war who
have committed offenses while in captivity. See G. TREAD WELL, supra at 61-67; 2 Inter-
national Law, supra at 85-90; Jaworski, Military Trial of Prisoners of War, 7 TEX. B.J.
310 (1944); The Law of Land Warfare, supra at 62-72.
147 2 RecoRDs 330; see also id. at 323, 333.
148 See id. at 570, 595, 656. See generally E. DImBAuLD, supra note 61, at 172-73;
SNEDEER 51; 2 STORY 110-11; WA REN 482-84.
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of war."'149 The floor debate amendment to the Committee of Detail's
report may have been made with the intention to fill the legislative
gap created by the deletion of this war power. Furthermore, since the
provision offered on the floor was virtually identical to its predecessor
in the Articles of Confederation,'5 0 one must assume that it was in-
tended to grant the same power, the power, that is, to enact articles
of war and establish courts-martial. 151
Far more controversial at the convention were the militia clauses 52
which provoked perhaps as much debate as all the Constitution's other
war and military provisions combined.'5 Undoubtedly, this disagree-
ment among the delegates was attributable to their strong feelings
on the sensitive issues of federalism, military preparedness, and stand-
ing armies, issues unavoidable in any discussion of the proper federal
role of the state militia.
The Committee of Detail reported out the following provision:
[Congress shall have the power to] make laws for organizing arm-
ing and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of
them as may be employed in the service of the U-S reserving to
the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and author-
ity of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by the U. States.9 4
By its use of the word "govern" the convention dearly intended to
authorize Congress to establish a system of military justice over the
state militia while it was actually participating in federal service. Its
intention with regard to Congress's power over state militia forces
149 2 RxcoRns 144.
150 Note 116 supra.
151 Id.
152 The Congress shall have Power...
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress ....
U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
153 See 1 REcoans 21, 47, 54, 61, 245, 247, 293, 301; 2 id. at 135-36, 144-45, 159, 168,
182, 323, 326, 330-33, 337, 344, 352, 356, 368, 377, 380-82, 384-90, 394, 570, 595, 616-17;
3 id. at 624, 628-29. See generally 2 G. CuRans, supra note 83, at 334-38; E. DUM4BAULD,
supra note 61, at 173-77 (1964); FARRAND 142-43; J. Scorr, THE Mn.rriA, S. Doc. No. 695,
64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917); 2 STORY 114-17; THE FEDz"AL No. 29 (A. Hamilton);
Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARv. L Rv. 181 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as Militia Clause].
154 2 Rcoiws 356.
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when not in federal service remains, however, an enigma. Rufus King,
a member of the committee, explained first that the term "disci-
plining" in the provision meant "prescribing the manual exercise
evolutions &c."'155 When Madison added that "the term 'disciplining'
[did not refer] to penalties & Courts martial for enforcing them,"'150
King reconsidered and stated "that laws for disciplining, must in-
volve penalties and every thing necessary for enforcing penalties."'157
Jonathan Dayton then unsuccessfully proposed a substitute clause
which would apparently have given the federal government no power
whatever 6ver the militia when not in actual federal service. 58 A
similar proposal by Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman to excise the
ambiguous word "disciplining"'159 -thereby eliminating any possibil-
ity of its being construed to include the power to court-martial non-
federal militiamen-was also defeated.160 During the debate, General
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina stated that he "preferred the
clause reported by the Committee, extending the meaning of it to
the case of fines &c-."'' The provision as reported by the committee
was in fact adopted almost verbatim by the convention.8 2
This progression in the convention's debate appears superficially
to indicate that King's second interpretation of "discipline" (including
the power to conduct courts-martial of members of the militia, even
when they were not engaged in United States service) was accepted
155 Id. at 385.
156 Id.
'57 Id. (emphasis in original). The same lack of clarity is reflected in an earlier debate
upon a motion by Mason to add to the powers of the federal government the power
"to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the Militia of the several States."
Id. at 330. Without any indication of whether the relevant word for him is "regulation"
or "discipline," Oliver Ellsworth's comments on Mason's proposition at least reveal an
awareness that the power to legislate military justice was at issue: "The States will never
submit to the same militia laws. Three or four shilling's [sic] as a penalty will enforce
obedience better in New England, than forty lashes in some other places." Id. at 332.
See also 1 id. at 293; 2 id. at 135-36, 144, 159, 168, 328, 826, 352, 856, 368, 380-81.
158 2 id. at 385-86. Dayton's proposition stated:
To establish an uniform & general system of discipline for the Militia of these
States, and to make laws for organizing, arming, disciplining & governing such
part of them as may be employed in the service of the U. S., reserving to the
States respectively the appointment of the officers, and all authority over the
Militia not herein given to the General Government.
Id. (emphasis in original).
159 Their proposal would have granted Congress the power "[to establish an uni-
formity of arms, exercise & organization for the Militia, and to provide for the Government
of them when called into the service of the U. States." Id. at 886.
160 Id. at 387.
161 Id. at 386.
162 Id. at 387-88.
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by the delegates. Yet such a construction renders the word "governing"
in the provision no more than meaningless surplusage. Futhermore,
in light of the obvious sense of the term "discipline" in the provision's
last clause as referring to a prescribed mode of training, this construc-
tion fails to offer an explanation why the earlier term "disciplining"
would be used to mean something else. Subsequent history provides
some clarification of this puzzle, but no really persuasive conclusions
can be drawn solely from the debates of the convention. 16 3
Since the Constitutional Convention concentrated upon the struc-
ture and powers of the new federal government, the military was amply
provided for. The liberty side of the ledger, however, did not fare so
well. Although several specific civil liberties were indeed incorporated
into various provisions of the Constitution,"" they were adopted essen-
tially on a piecemeal basis. No serious consideration was given by the
convention to the inclusion in the Constitution of a comprehensive
bill of rights.165
163 The Supreme Court has specifically held that in at least one circumstance, refusal
to obey the call of the President into federal service, militiamen not in federal service may
be tried by a federal court-martial. Such a court-martial, however, has not been justified
Under the power to govern the militia granted by article I, section 8, but rather as an
incident of Congress's power to call forth the militia into federal service. Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820); see 32 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1970). See generally WINTrutop 96-97.
164 E.g., rights connected with writs of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, obligations of contracts, and convictions for treason. Charles Pinckney and
Elbridge Gerry had moved to insert a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be
inviolably observed" (2 RECORDS 617), but the motion was rejected. The delegates felt
that it was unnecessary since Congress had not been granted any power which extended
control over the press. Id. at 617-18, 620; FARRAND 189.
165 Commenting upon the delegates' failure to include a bill of rights, James Wilson
said in the Pennsylvania ratification convention,
I believe the truth is, that such an idea never entered the mind of many of
them. I do not recollect to have heard the subject mentioned till within about
three days of the time of our rising; and even then, there was no direct motion
offered for any thing of the kind.
2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERmAL CONSTrrON 435-36 (2d rev. ed. 1859) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT]. Wilson's
memory was not perfect, but it was essentially correct. On May 29, 1787, Pinckney had
originally submitted a plan of government to be considered by the Committee of the
Whole along with the Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Randolph the same day. 1
REcoRDs 16, 23, 24. See generally 8 id. at 603-09; DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMA-
TION OF Tm UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 898, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
964-66 (C. Tiansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS]; C. NOTT, THE MYSTERY OF
TH PINCKNEY DRAucrr (1908); Jameson, Portions of Charles Pinckney's Plan for a Con-
stitution, 1787, 8 Am. HIST. REv. 509 (1903); Jameson, Sketch of Pinckney's Plan for a
Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HisT. REv. 735 (1904).
Pinckney's initial proposals apparently did include guaranties for such personal liberties
as freedom of speech and religion, and right to a jury trial. 8 RECORDS 609 &c n.3. No
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Because jury trial in criminal cases was one of the few guaranties
of liberty adopted by the convention, the absence of a general bill of
rights in the Constitution highlights the historical significance of the
jury guaranty. No jury trial provision had been originally contained
in the Virginia Plan or the New Jersey Plan, the two basic formula-
tions from which the Constitution was ultimately constructed.'1 6 On
August 6, 1787, however, the Committee of Detail reported a draft
constitution which for the first time contained the following clause:
"The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachments
shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall be by
Jury."' 67 The acceptability and familiarity of such a guaranty was
apparently so universal that it provoked no recorded discussion on
the convention floor.168 In particular, no mention was made of its
further mention, however, is made in the convention records of his plan until July 24,
when it is noted that the Committee of the Whole was discharged from acting upon the
plan and that it was referred to the Committee of Detail along with some other pro-
visions. 2 id. at 98, 106. In August, Pinckney apparently submitted to the convention a
second, smaller list, also referred to the Committee of Detail. Id. at 334-37, 340-42. This is
the last mention in the convention records of the Pinckney Plan. Near the end of the con-
vention, however, Gerry did make a motion to establish a committee to study the indusion
in the Constitution of a bill of rights. Id. at 587-88. Although he was incorrect about there
not having been an earlier motion, Wilson was undoubtedly referring to Gerry's action.
On the other hand, Wilson was correct in attributing no significance to the event because
the motion was unanimously defeated by the state delegations. Id. at 582, 588. See gener-
ally FARRAN 185-86; WARREN 506-10. On the final day of deliberations in the convention,
Randolph moved to authorize the states to propose amendments to the Constitution as
approved by the convention and then to call a new convention to reconsider the whole
matter. He was seconded by Gerry and Mason, but the motion was rejected and the Con-
stitution adopted. 2 Racoas 631-33, 634; see id. at 564. When the engrossed draft was
presented to the delegates for their signatures on September 17, all signed but Randolph,
Mason, and Gerry (id. at 648-49), and each of them gave as one reason for his refusal
the absence of a bill of rights. See, e.g., Mason's Objection to This Constitution of Govern-
ment, in id. at 637-40.
166 See FARRAND 131. For the Virginia Plan, see 3 REcoRns app. C. For the New
Jersey Plan, see id. app. E. The Hamilton Plan appears in id. app. F.
167 2 id. at 187. For the origin of this provision within the Committee of Detail,
see E. DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 368; 2 RacoRns 144, 173.
108 FARRAN 156; WARREN 546-47. There was, however, a brief debate on September
12 regarding the propriety of including a guaranty of the right to trial by jury in civil
cases. After comments by Roger Sherman and Nathaniel Gorham to the effect that no
general prescription could be drafted which would adequately separate those cases in
which a civil jury was appropriate from those in which it was not, the subject was
dropped. 2 REcoRns 587-88. Pinckney and Gerry tried again on the date of the final vote
on the Constitution by moving to annex at the end of the criminal jury trial provision
the words, "And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases." Id. at 628.
The objections were reiterated and this motion also failed. Id. See generally FARu.Am 185;
THE FEDRA&r No. 83 (A. Hamilton).
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applicability to the military services.169 After several minor changes, 170
it was adopted as part of section 2, article III:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not commit-
ted within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed.17'
Taking the actions of the Constitutional Convention as a whole,
several important conclusions may be drawn. First, the legislative
history of the Constitution clearly indicates that the convention did
intend to grant Congress the power to establish and regulate courts-
martial for the military forces. Secondly, the express words of the Con-
stitution guarantee the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. On the
other hand, neither the words themselves nor the recorded legislative
history specifically reveal what relationship, if any, the jury was meant
to have to the court-martial. Nevertheless, the documented familiarity
of the convention delegates with the nature of each institution may
indicate that their silence suggests that the jury and the court-martial
were contemplated to have no constitutional relationship whatever. 72
IV
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Before it could become effective, nine of the thirteen states had
to ratify the new Constitution.' 3 The failure to include a comprehen-
169 See Henderson 300-01.
170 2 REcoRDs 434, 438, 444, 576, 601.
171 The bill of attainder clauses of the Constitution (art. I, §§ 9, 10) might also be
construed as guaranties of the right to trial by jury, since to the extent that a bill of
attainder is tantamount to a legislative conviction for a criminal act, it works a deprivation
of the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.
R v. 865, 867-68, 876-77 (1960). See also THE FEDE.ALxSr, supra note 78, No. 44, at 282
(J. Madison).
172 See Henderson 300-01. The Convention records indicate that on the same day
the criminal jury trial guaranty was adopted, the delegates also passed the provision pro-
hibiting suspension of the writ of habeas corpus "unless where in cases of Rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it." 2 REcoaDs 438. At least this indicates an
awareness by the delegates of an incompatibility and perhaps an irreconcilability between
civilian liberties and military exigencies.
173 U.S. CoNsT., art. VII; 2 REcoRDs 665-66. For some specific material on ratification
in the individual states, see F. BATES, RHODE ISLAND AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION
(1898); P. FoRD, THE ORIGIN, PurosE AND RESULT OF THE HARRISBURG CoNV TIrzoN OF 1788
(1890); S. HARDING, THE CoNTEsT OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE FnmDER. CoNSrrrusoN
IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSErTs (1896); D. KENT, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CON-
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sive bill of rights, however, soon proved to be one of the most criticized
features of the Constitution.'" Thomas Jefferson, writing to James
Madison from Paris, said of the new Constitution,
I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill
of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against stand-
ing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unre-
mitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all
matters of fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the law
of Nations.... Let me add that a bill of rights is what the peo-
ple are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on
inference.175
Even the existing constitutional guaranty of the right to trial by
STITTmON (1964); H. LEFLER, A PLEA FOR FEDERAL UNION: NORTH CAROLINA, 1788 (1947);
C. MINER, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION BY TIM STATE OF NMV YORK
(1921); D. MYERS, MASSACHUSETTS AND =r Fmsr TEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSrIrUTION,
S. Doe. No. 181, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); L. TRENHOLME, THE RATIFICATION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITrTION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1932); J. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE NEW
HAMPSHIRE CONVENTION FOR THE INVESTIGATION, DIscUsSION AND DECISION OF ME FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1888); Heslin, "Amendments are Necessary," 43 N.Y. HiST. Soc'y Q. 425
(1959). For some original reports of the proceedings in the state ratifying conventions,
see 10 N. BOUTON, MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO NE3V HAMPSHIRE
AT DIFFERENT PERIODS 1-22 (1877); DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
OF VIRGINIA (D. Robertson ed. 2d ed. 1805); DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788 (C. Hale & B. Pierce
eds. 1856); THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK (J. Sickley, A. Peckham & A. Peters eds. 1905); 1-2 DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (T. Lloyd ed. 1788); DEBATES WnCH AROSE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ON THE CONSTITUTION FRAMED FOR
THE UNITED STATES (R. Haswell ed. 1788); 2, 3, & 4 ELLIOT; PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL
CONSTIUTION, 1787-1788 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CARoLINA (1789); VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE
STATz OF MARYLAND, NOVEMBER SESSION, 1787 (1787).
174 Before the Confederation Congress, under whose auspices the Constitutional
Convention had been conducted, was even able to transmit the Constitution to the states
for ratification, it first had to overcome an attempt by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia to
append to the document a bill of rights which would ensure the rights of conscience,
freedom of the press, trial by civil jury, security against unreasonable searches and
seizures, petition, and freedom from excessive bail or punishments. His motion was
defeated 11 states to one (New York). See 33 JOURNALs 540-42. See also 2 G. BANCROFT,
supra note 83, at 225-30. For general discussions of the contemporary objections to the
Constitution based on the absence of a bill of rights, see, e.g., M. JENSEN, THE MAKING
OF TH AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 130-38 (1964); Mason, supra note 135, at 74-88. See
generally ESSAYS ON THE CONSrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DIS-
CUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 (P. Ford ed. 1892); PAMImHLErS ON THE CONSTITUrTION
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 (P. Ford ed. 1888); THE
FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton).
175 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). Jefferson expressed
similar sentiments in several other of his letters. See, e.g., 13 id. at 442-43; 14 id. at 688.
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jury in criminal cases was not immune from criticism. 176 In par-
ticular, the Antifederalists contended that the right to a jury drawn
only from the vicinage had been insufficiently protected 177 and that
auxiliary rights such as indictment by grand jury,178 the assistance of
counsel, 179 and confrontation of witnesses'80 should have been spe-
cifically guaranteed by the Constitution.
The military provisions of the Constitution were also subjected
to great Antifederalist criticism. As with the Constitutional Conven-
tion delegates, many of the delegates to the state ratifying conventions
had had personal military experience and were therefore thoroughly
familiar with the ways of the military, including its system of criminal
justice.'18 Congress's power under the Constitution to raise and sup-
176 Perhaps the most significant bone of contention between the Federalists and the
Antifederalists regarding the bill of rights, however, was the dispute over the necessity
and propriety of a civil jury trial provision. For the Federalist position see, e.g., 2 ELLIOT
112, 114 (Mass.); id. at 488, 515-19, 539-40 (Pa.); 3 id. at 68, 203-04, 468-69, 534, 550, 557-58,
561, 573 (Va.); 4 id. at 144-45, 147, 151-52, 164-66, 170-71, 208 (N.C.); id. at 259-60, 294-95,
306-08 (S.C.); Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution, IV, in ANI-FEDERALISTS VEmsS
FEDERAmsIrs 113, 115 (J. Lewis ed. 1967); Jay, Address to the People of New York, in id.
at 101, 105; Wilson, Defense in the State House of Pennsylvania, in id. at 91-93; THE
FEDERALIsr No. 83 (A. Hamilton). For the Antifederalist argument see, e.g., 2 ELLIOT
338-39 (N.Y.); 3 id. at 218, 324, 446-47, 540-41, 544, 568, 610-11 (Va.); 4 id. at 143, 154-55,
167, 170, 202-03 (N.C.); id. at 290 (S.C.); Winthrop, Letters of Agrippa, in ANrx-FEDERALISrS
VERSus FEDERALisrs, supra at 161, 180; Gerry, Observations by a Columbian Patriot, in id.
at 181, 183; Lee, Letters of the Federal Farmer, in id. at 202, 202-05; 12 THsx PAPERS OF
THoMAs JEFFERSON 440 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). See also Akerman, The Seventh Amendment-
The Right to Trial by Jury in Civil Cases, 48 WomtEN LAw. J. 16 (1962); Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. Rzv. 289 (1966). Despite the con-
tention of the Antifederalists that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had
conspired to deprive the citizenry of its right to trial by civil jury, George Washington
was undoubtedly correct when he wrote,
Mhere was not a member of the convention, I believe, who had the least ob-
jection to what is contended for by the Advocates for . . . Tryal by Jury ...
[1]t was only the difficulty of establishing a mode which should not interfere
with the fixed modes of any of the States, that induced the Convention to leave
it, as a matter of future adjustment.
3 REcoRDs 297-98 (emphasis in original).
177 Compare 2 ELLIOT 112 (Mass.); id. at 400 (N.Y.); 3 id. at 447, 545, 568-69, 578-79
(Va.); 4 id. at 150, 154, 211 (N.C.); with 2 id. at 109-10 (Mass.); id. at 450 (Pa.); 3 id. at
467, 520-21, 537, 546-47, 558 (Va.). The issue of vicinage was often confused by the dis-
putants with the issue of venue. HELLE5 93. See generally Blume, The Place of Trial of
Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 Micn. L. REv. 59 (1944); Connor,
The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 197
(1909); Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 VA. L.
Rav. 287 (1926).
178 E.g., 2 ELLIOT 110-11, 113.
179 E.g., id. at 110-11.
180 E.g., 3 id. at 467. See generally HELLE:R 26-27; 2 STORY 590-91.
181 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT 117 (remarks of Samuel Spencer).
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port armies and navies especially caught their attention. The vesting
of such authority in the federal government was viewed as an implicit
grant of authority for the retention of a national standing army.182
Some criticism was also directed at what many construed to be an
undue grant of power to the President over the military forces. 8
Most severe, however, were arguments relating to the issue of
federal control over the state militia forces. The ambiguity concerning
Congress's authority to prescribe military justice regulations and to
conduct courts-martial of militia members when not in federal ser-
vice 4 provoked comment from civil libertarians and states rightists
alike. Apparently the critics were not mollifed by the Constitution's
supporters,185 because their concern over the alleged federal power to
court-martial militiamen not in federal service later found prominent
expression in many of the proposed amendments to the Constitution
suggested by the state conventions.
In general, the arguments and assurances of the Federalists 8 6
182 Compare 3 id. at 410, 588, 611 (Va.); with 2 id. at 97-98 (Mass.); id. at 468, 520-21
(Pa.); 3 id. at 413, 600 (Va.); and 4 id. at 260-61 (S.C.). See also Letter of a Democratic
Federalist, in ANmm-FEmDEnrs VEmsus FxanP.Asrs, supra note 176, at 152, 156-57; 3
Rrcows 207; Tm FznALIsT Nos. 24-26 (A. Hamilton), 41 (J. Madison).
183 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT 388, 392-93, 401, 496; 4 id. at 107-08, 114-15, 258. See also TBE
FEDERAUSr Nos. 69,74 (A. Hamilton).
184 See notes 152-63 and accompanying text supra.
185 Mr. LEE . . . [Mr. Mason] says, that organizing the militia gives Congress
power to punish them when not in the actual service of the government. The
gentleman is mistaken in the meaning of the word organization, to explain
which would unnecessarily take up time. Suffice it to say, it does not include the
infliction of punishments. The militia will be subject to the common regulations
of war when in actual service; but not in time of peace.
3 ELLIOT 407 (emphasis in original).
Mr. MASON [reported in the third person] . . . He was not satisfied with the
explanation of the word organization by the gentleman in the military line,
(Mr. Lee.)
He thought they were not confined to the technical explanation, but that
Congress could inflict severe and ignominious punishments on the militia, as a
necessary incident to the power of organizing and disciplining them .... The
gentleman [Lee] had said that they would be only subject to martial law when
in actual service. He [Mason] demanded what was to hinder Congress from
inflicting it always, and making a general law for the purpose. If so, said he, it
must finally produce, most infallibly, the annihilation of the state govern-
ments....
Mr. MADISON replied, that the obvious explanation was, that the states
were to appoint the officers, and govern all the militia except that part which was
called into the actual service of the United States.
Id. at 415-16 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 380-81, 391, 400, 418, 421, 424, 426, 440.
See generally 3 REcoRDs 207-09; 2 STORY 114-16; THE FEDMAIST No. 29 (A. Hamilton);
Militia Clause 214-15.
186 For example, the Federalists pointed out that several of the states themselves had
no bill of rights and yet apparently no one considered the people's liberties in those
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regarding the security of -personal liberties under the Constitution
fell upon deaf ears. The proponents of a bill of rights were not to be
placated by academic arguments; they wanted guaranties of substance
written into the Constitution. Some Antifederalists even proposed the
calling of a new convention to redraft the Constitution; 187 others sug-
gested that ratification by the states be made conditional upon the
annexation of a bill of rights.188 These divisive measures were strongly
resisted by Madison, Hamilton, and the other Federalists because they
knew that postponement of universal ratification would only permit
the dissenters to gather forces and mount a full-scale attack upon the
proposed union.
By January 1788, the Federalists had succeeded in obtaining
ratification in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut.'8 9 But opposition to the Constitution was increasing in
some of the other states, and the conventions of two of the most
important states, New York and Virginia, had not even commenced.
states to be in jeopardy. E.g., 2 ELLIOT 436; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 78, No. 84, at 511
(A. Hamilton). The most frequent and perhaps most persuasive of the Federalists' argu-
ments concerned the nature of a limited government. The speech of James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention expressed this argument.
But in a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for
the United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecesary, but, in my
humble judgment, highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and
rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a
constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumera-
tion, every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The con-
sequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power
into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered
incomplete.
2 ELLIOT 436 (emphasis in original). See also 3 id. at 466-69, 620; 4 id. at 315-16; THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 78, No. 84, at 513-14 (A. Hamilton); 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMEs
MADISON 271-72 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as MADISON]. Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina added a distinctly Southern reason for the undesirability of
a bill of rights:
Such bills generally begin with declaring that all men are by nature born free.
Now, we should make that declaration with a very bad grace, when a large part
of our property consists in men who are actually born slaves.
4 ELLIOT 316.
187 See, e.g., BILL OF RIGHTs 15 n.17, 27 n.54; R. RUTLAND, THE ORDAL OF TH-E
CONSTITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALIsTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788 ch. 15
(1966); Smith, The Movement Towards a Second Constitutional Convention in 1788, in
ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD,
1775-1789, at 46 (J. Jameson ed. 1889).
188 Jefferson had advocated that four of the 13 states withhold ratification to pressure
the other nine into adopting a bill of rights. See Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson and
American Constitutional Law, 2 J. PUB. L. 370, 381-83 (1953).
189 Delaware ratified on December 7, 1787, Pennsylvania on December 12, 1787, New
Jersey on December 18, 1787, Georgia on January 2, 1788, and Connecticut on January 9,
1788. See WARUEN app. D.
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A solution to the deadlock over a bill of rights was finally provided
by Massachusetts. Nine proposed amendments were appended to its
act of ratification with an expression of "opinion" that they would
"remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the good
people of the commonwealth."'190 Thereafter Maryland was the only
state to ratify without proposing any amendments. 191 South Carolina,'19 2
New Hampshire, 193 Virginia, 94 and New York 95 all followed the
example of Massachusetts and attached numerous proposed amend-
ments to their acts of ratification. 96 It seems quite clear that these
proposed amendments were of fundamental significance in defeating
the Antifederalists and assuring the ratification of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Federalists had in effect made a binding pledge
to enact a bill of rights in the first Congress; 197 had this moral obliga-
tion been ignored, the legitimacy of the new federal government
would have been severely impaired.
190 2 ELLIOT 177. See also BILL OF R GHTS 14. A series of amendments had been pre-
viously proposed by a minority delegation to the Pennsylvania convention (id. at 173-75),
but they were rejected by the convention majority and Pennsylvania ratified the Con-
stitution on December 12, 1787, without qualifications. The suggestions of the Pennsylvania
minority, however, were published in local newspapers and also circulated by broadsheet.
Id. at 10 & nn.2-5.
191 April 28, 1788. DocumENTs 1021. A committee had been appointed by the
Maryland convention to consider amendments. The committee filed majority and minority
reports, but the convention decided to ratify the Constitution without formally consider-
ing them. See BILL OF RIGHTs 17-18. For the amendments approved by the committee
majority, see 2 ELLIOT 550-52. For those approved by the minority, see id. at 552-53.
192 DocumLNTs 1022-24.
193 Id. at 1024-27.
194 Id. at 1027-34.
195 Id. at 1034-44.
195 North Carolina did not ratify until November 21, 1789, approximately one month
after the Bill of Rights had already been adopted by the first Congress. The state had
previously rejected the Constitution at a ratifying convention, because of, inter alia, the
absence of a bill of rights. Nevertheless, the convention had proposed a series of amend-
ments. See id. at 1044-51. Furthermore, the disgruntled Pennsylvania minority (note 190
supra) held a second convention at Harrisburg after Pennsylvania's ratification without
amendments. The Harrisburg convention also proposed a series of amendments (2
ELIsOT 545-46) which the delegates considered essential to complete the Constitution.
See generally P. FoRD, supra note 173. Rhode Island, the last to ratify, also proposed
amendments. DocuMENTs 1052-59. However, since Rhode Island did not ratify until eight
months after Congress had passed the Bill of Rights, its suggestions had no effect. See Bu.
or R GHTs 31-32.
197 Madison had himself previously admitted a willingness to accept amendments in
the form of a bill of rights, but only if required to by the pressure of public opinion.
5 MAnisoN 271. Apparently such pressure had been applied because support for a bill
of rights was a major plank in his election platform when Madison ran for a seat in the
first Congress. He clearly felt a moral obligation to fulfill his pledge. See BILL OF RiGsHrs
33 9- n.1; see also 5 MADIsoN 319 n.1; R. RuTLAND, supra note 187, at 297. Nevertheless,
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THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The first Congress of the United States met in New York on
March 4, 1789. On June 8, James Madison introduced in the House
of Representatives a set of proposed amendments to the Constitution.198
Despite the public clamor for a bill of rights, Madison's efforts in this
regard did not go unhindered. Some Federalist members of Congress
still believed amendments to be unnecessary.199 Still other members
desired first to complete the unfinished task of legislating the structure
of the national government within the interstices of the new Consti-
tution.20 0 Although the House agreed to submit the propositions to
a Committee of the Whole,20' the subject was not further mentioned
until July 21 when Madison again raised the issue. After more attempts
to postpone discussion, the House finally voted to discharge the Com-
mittee of the Whole and refer the amendments to a select committee
of one member from each state.202
Madison had introduced a total of nine separate propositions in
June. His seventh proposition, from which the jury and grand jury
provisions of the fifth and sixth amendments originally derived, was
stated in the following terms:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on
actual service, in time of war or public danger) shall be by an
impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other ac-
it was definitely Madison's intention to advocate or support only those amendments which
would not "injure the Constitution" (1 TnE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN TmE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES 432 (J. Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS])
or weaken "its frame, or abridg[e] its usefulness" (id. at 441). See also 5 MADISON 309,
311, 405 n.1; Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARv. L. REv. 49, 112 (1923).
198 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 433-36. For general discussion of the origin, development
in Congress, and ratification by the states of the Bill of Rights, see BILL OF RIGHTS 33-50;
F. DONOVAN, supra note 83, ch. 7; HELLER 29-33; A. MASON, supra note 135, at 93-97;
J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1789-1801 ch. 2 (1960); R. Ru.TLAN, supra note 64, ch. 9.
See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960); Brant, The Madison
Heritage, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 882 (1960); Risjord, The Bill of Rights: Comments on Its
Historical Development, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 1201, 1201-04; Warren, supra note 197.
198 See, e.g., 1 DEBATES & PRocEEINGs 442, 447-49; see also Warren, supra note 197, at
116 & n.151.
200 See, e.g., 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 444-46. See also Warren, supra note 197, at 115,
117-18.
201 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 450.
202 Id. at 664-65.
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customed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life
or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an
essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed
within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in
which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law
be authorized in some other county of the same State, as near as
may be to the seat of the offence.
In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial
may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed.
20 3
Madison had culled several different concepts from the various sug-
gestions of the state ratifying conventions to form this seventh propo-
sition. Virginia,20° New York,20 5 and North Carolina20 6 had each offered
a guaranty of the right to trial by petit jury in criminal cases.207 Mass-
achusetts,2 0 New Hampshire,20 9 and New York210 had proposed a right
to grand jury presentment or indictment in felony cases. All five states
had excepted the land and naval forces from these guaranties.2 11 Fin-
203 BILL OF RIGHTS 208-09. The last sentence of Madison's seventh proposition, not
quoted in the text above, was a guaranty of trial by jury in civil cases: "In suits at com-
mon law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." Id. at 209. Madison also suggested, in
his fifth proposition, that trial by jury in criminal cases be guaranteed against infringement
by the states: "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of
the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." Id. at 208.
204 Id. at 183.84 (art. 8).
205 Id. at 190-91.
206 Id. at 200 (art. 8).
207 See also id. at 173 (art. 3) (Pa. minority resolution); cf. DocUMENTs 1053 (art. 8)
(R.I.). Regarding the particulars of the jury trial, Virginia, New York, and North
Carolina had each specified that it be an "impartial jury of the vicinage." (Maryland asked
only that trial be "according to the course of proceeding in the state where the offence is
committed." BraL OF RiG Ts 177 (art. 2) (Md.)). All three states also stipulated that
conviction must be by unanimous verdict. See also Pa. minority resolution, supra; cf.
Dociumrs 1053 (art. 8) (R.I.). Finally, Virginia (BILL OF RIG=Ts 188) and North Carolina
(id. at 204) guaranteed the right of challenge to biased jurors. None of the states proposed,
as did Madison in his seventh proposition, that the jury be of freeholders. But see Pa.
minority resolution, supra ("no man be deprived of his liberty, except by ... the judg-
ment of his peers').
Upon presenting to Congress his proposed amendments, Madison said of trial by jury:
[It] cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social
compact, which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure
the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.
1 DmA^TES & PRocrmINGs 437.
208 BiLL OF R irlrs 176 (art. 6).
209 Id. at 181 (art. 6).
210 Id. at 190-91.
211 Id. at 183-84 (art. 8) (jetit jury) (Va.); id. at 190-91 (grand and petit jury) (N.Y.);
id. at 181 (art. 6) (grand jury) (N.H.); id. at 176 (art. 6) (grand jury) (Mass.); id. at 200
(art. 8) (petit jury) (N.C.); see id. at 177 (art. 2) (petit jury) (Md.); cf. DocuMENTs 1053 (art.
8) (petit jury) (R.I.).
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ally, Virginia,212 New York,213 and North Carolina214 had each proposed
an identical amendment to the effect that "the militia shall not be
subject to martial law, except when in actual service in time of war,
invasion or rebellion."215 Only New York had brought all of these
212 BILL OF RIGHTS 187 (art. 11).
213 Id. at 190.
214 Id. at 203 (art. 11).
215 Id. See id. at 178 (art. 13) (Md.); 2 ELLIOT 545-46 (art. 8) (Pa.); 4 id. at 249 (art. 3)
(N.C.) (rejected); cf. DocmrmNrs 1055 (art. 17) (R.I.). See generally Henderson 308-09;
Wiener, supra note 61, at 214.
Additional limitations upon the military were sprinkled throughout the proposals of
the state ratifying conventions. They included guaranteeing the right to bear arms (BILL
OF RIGHTs 185 (art. 17) (Va.); id. at 182 (art. 12) (N.H.); id. at 189 (N.Y.); id. at 201 (art.
17) (N.C.)), restricting the quartering of soldiers in private homes (id. at 185 (art. 18) (Va.);
id. at 182 (art. 10) (N.H.); id. at 190 (N.Y.); id. at 201 (art. 18) (N.C.)), prohibiting a stand.
ing army (id. at 185 (art. 17) (Va.); id. at 187 (art. 9) (Va.); id. at 190, 194 (N.Y.); id. at 201
(art. 17) (N.C.); id. at 203 (art. 9) (N.C.)), declaring that the military should be strictly
subordinated to civilian authority (id. at 185 (art. 17) (Va.); id. at 190 (N.Y.); id. at 201
(art. 17) (N.C.)), requiring a two-thirds congressional majority to declare war (id. at 195
(N.Y.)), placing restrictions on the President's personal command of armies in the field
(id. at 196 (N.Y.)), limiting the use of foreign troops within the United States (id. at 205
(art. 26) (N.C.)), prohibiting the use of the militia outside their respective states (id. at
198 (N.Y.)), restricting militia duty in the federal service to a two-month period (2 ELLIoT
546 (art. 8) (Pa.)), limiting the period of military enlistment (BILL OF RIGHTs 187 (art. 10)
(Va.); id. at 203 (art. 10) (N.C.)), and exempting conscientious objectors from all military
service (id. at 185 (art. 19) (Va.); id. at 201 (art. 19) (N.C.)). Some members of the Maryland
convention even wished to adopt the English practice of requiring the legislature periodi-
cally to renew its military justice laws. BILL OF RIGIITs 178 (art. 11) ("no mutiny bill
[Will] continue in force longer than two years').
Of all these military proposals, however, only two-the quartering provisions and
the right to bear arms-bore any fruit in terms of final acceptance by the first Congress
as amendments to the Constitution. The guaranty of the right to bear arms became the
second amendment to the Constitution: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." See generally Rohner, The Right To Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitu-
tional History, 16 CArI. U.L. REv. 53 (1966); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.BA.J.
554, 665 (1965); Comment, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms: A Necessary Constitutional
Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights?, 81 ALBANY L. Ray. 74
(1967).
The fourth clause of the fourth proposal introduced by Madison, from which the
second amendment was derived, had also stated that "no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." 1 DEBATs &
PROCEEDINGS 434. This clause remained in the amendments as adopted by the House of
Representatives on August 24, 1789 (BILL OF RIGHTS 214), having withstood a motion in
the Committee of the Whole to eliminate it. 1 DBATES & PROCEEDINGS 766-67. The Senate,
however, voted to strike the clause from the amendment. BILL oF RIGHTS 46 & n.6, 217.
The Senate then arranged the amendment in its present form and it was agreed to with-
out alteration by the House of Representatives. Id. at 220. See generally Brahms, They
Step to a Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the Current Department of Defense
Position Vis-A-Vis In-Service Conscientious Objection, 47 Mu.. L. R-v. 1, 4-11 (1970);
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcasco v. Watkins,
51 Gao. L.J. 252, 263-64 (1963); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L
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elements together in one amendment as Madison had in his seventh
proposition.216
On July 28, 1789, the select committee made its report to the
House of Representatives.2 17 The committee had combined part of
Madison's fourth proposition 218 with his seventh to produce its own
proposal:
[1] In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
[2] The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment,
and in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger) shall be
by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requi-
site of unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge and other
accustomed requisites; and no person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment by a Grand Jury; but if a crime be committed in a
RLV. 806, 806-13 (1958); Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in
the United States, 20 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 409, 436-38 (1952). See also Macgill, Selective
Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1355 (1968);
Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56
CALF. L. Rav. 379 (1968); Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amend-
ment: There But for the Grace of God .... 34 U. Cm. L. R. 79 (1966).
During the debate in the House on what ultimately became the second amendment,
a motion was made but rejected to append a clause prohibiting a standing army and
subordinating the military to the civil authority. I DEBATES 8 PROCEEINGS 751-52. A sim-
ilar motion was rejected by the Senate during its deliberation on the second amendment.
BIL' oF RIGHTs 46. On August 18, Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina moved to
refer to the House Committee of the Whole 17 additional amendments for its considera-
tion. 1 DEBATs 8- PROCEEDINGs 760-62. Among them was a proposal to change the wording
of the section on the President's powers over the military from the "commander in
chief" to "power to direct (agreeable to law) the operations." Id at 762. The motion to
refer did not pass. Id. at 763. The remainder of the Virginia proposals (including the
restriction on the period of military enlistments) which Madison had not incorporated
into his amendments were submitted to the Senate on September 8 to be considered along
with the House-passed amendments. They all were rejected by the Senate. BIL OF RIGHTS
47 & n.14.
216 BsLL OF RIGHTs 190-91. Although the Virginia bill of rights and the proposed
amendments of the Virginia ratifying convention provided the primary bases for Madison's
proposed amendments in the first Congress (text accompanying note 76 supra), the New
York proposal appears to have been the model for his seventh proposition.
217 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 672.
218 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence.
Id. at 435.
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place in the possession of an enemy, or in which an insurrection
may prevail, the indictment and trial may by law be authorized
in some other place within the same State; and if it be committed
in a place not within a State, the indictment and trial may be at
such place or places as the law may have directed.219
A Committee of the Whole adopted both clauses on August 18.220 The
only change made by the Committee of the Whole was to accept a mo-
tion by Samuel Livermore to amend clause one so as "to secure to the
criminal the right of being tried in the State where the offence was
committed." 221 Since clause two already purported to accomplish this
result,222 and since no later recorded form of clause one reflects an
amendment in this regard, it does not appear that Livermore's motion
had any effect upon these provisions. 223
The House itself adopted clauses one and two on August 20,224
and referred all adopted amendments to a committee of three for
final arrangement.2 25 On August 24, the committee reported and the
219 BILL oF RIGHTs 211-12.
220 1 DEBATES & PRoCmiNGs 759-60. Also passed was the third clause of the select
committee's seventh proposition (BILL OF RIGHTS 212), originally the last sentence of
Madison's seventh proposition (note 203 supra), which guaranteed the right to trial by
jury in civil cases. 1 DEBATES 8 PROCEEDINGS 760. The select committee's and Madison's
fifth proposal, prohibiting the states from limiting the right to a jury in criminal cases
(BILL OF Rjxcrs 209, 212), had already been adopted. 1 DEBATES & PROcUEINGs 755.
221 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGs 756. Edanus Burke had attempted three alterations of
clauses one and two of the seventh proposition, all of which had failed: (1) to add a right
of the accused to obtain a continuance to serve process on material witnesses (id. at 756);
(2) to prohibit prosecution by information (id. at 756, 760); and (3) to change the word
"vicinage" to "district or county in which the offense has been committed" (id. at 760).
See generally HELLER 31.
222 See 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 756.
223 When ultimately submitted by the House to the Senate, the jury trial provision
mysteriously lacked the last sentence of the select committee's second clause relating to
venue for trials of crimes not committed within a state. BILL OF RiGiTrs 215. Livermore's
motion possibly explains this deletion. It may be, however, that the reporter of the
debate incorrectly recorded Livermore's motion as having passed when in fact it surely
failed. See id. at 41 n.28.
224 1 DEBATES & PROcEEDINGS 767. Also approved that day was the select committee's
fifth proposition, relating to criminal juries in the states (note 220 supra). I DEBATES &
PRocEDINGs 767. The next day the third clause of the select committee's seventh prop-
osition, guaranteeing the civil jury (note 220 supra), was also adopted. 1 DEBATEs &
PROVE EINGs 767.
225 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 778. Egbert Benson, Roger Sherman, and Theodore
Sedgwick were the committee members. Rearrangement of the amendments by this com-
mittee so as to append them seriatim to the end of the Constitution was contrary to
Madison's original plan. He had proposed that amendments be inserted at various ap-
propriate locations throughout the body of the Constitution. Compare id. at 708 (Madi-
son), 708-09 (Smith), 710 (Vining); with id. at 707-08 (Sherman), 709 (Livermore), 710
(Clymer). Duplication of the criminal jury trial provisions in article III and the sixth
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House formally approved and transmitted to the Senate seventeen
articles of amendment.226 Clauses one and two 227 were now labeled
as Article the Ninth and Article the Tenth, respectively. 228 The only
two changes of significance made by the House in the propositions
adopted by the Committee of the Whole were the deletion in what
became Article the Tenth of the requirement that jurors be freeholders,
and of the provision relating to the venue of trials for offenses com-
mitted outside a state. The recorded debates offer no explanation for
either change.229
Legislative history to this point clearly indicates that at least the
House of Representatives desired to exempt the military from trial
by petit jury. Although it is possible to argue that syntax indicates no
similar exception was originally intended with regard to the grand
jury, the preceding legislative history and the sense of Madison's
seventh proposition, taken as a whole, indicate that the House meant
to exempt the military from the grand jury guaranty also.2 30
Although several changes were made by the Senate in the criminal
jury trial provisions, no adequate record of the content of the Senate
debates over these provisions is extant.231 The House's ninth article,
prescribing a speedy trial and the rights of notice, confrontation, com-
pulsory process, and counsel, was renumbered by the Senate as Article
the Eighth, but no substantive changes were made.23 2 Significantly,
however, the tenth article of the House amendments was totally stripped
of its petit jury element. The remainder, guaranteeing only the right
to a grand jury indictment in felony cases, was then inserted into the
House-approved eighth article relating to double jeopardy, self-in-
amendment is probably explained by the committee's alteration of Madison's method.
Madison's seventh proposition, which ultimately formed the basis for the sixth amend-
ment jury trial provision, had begun with the introductory suggestion, "That in article
3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be inserted the clauses fol-
lowing .... Id. at 435. When the form of the Constitution's amendment changed rom
insertion to appendage, no attempt was made by Congress to eliminate or qualify the
article III jury trial provision; consequently, it remained intact in the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has decided that the criminal jury trial provisions of article III and the
sixth amendment are virtually coterminous. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298
(1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548-50 (1888). But see Cook v. United States, 138
U.S. 157, 181 (1891); United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 487 (1853). See gen-
erally E. DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 370-71; HELLER 35-38.
226 1 D.BATFs & PROCEEINGS 779.
227 Note 219 supra.
228 BILL OF RIGHTs 214-15. See generally id. at 44 n.44.
229 But see note 223 supra.
230 See Henderson 310.
231 The debates of the Senate at that time were held in secret.
232 BILL OF IGrfrs 46 n.9, 218.
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crimination, due process of law, and just compensation in eminent do-
main.2 33 The combined provision was renumbered as Article the
Seventh:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use without just compensation.23 4
This rearrangement of the House's proposals by the Senate for the
first time placed the military exception in an indisputable relationship
with the grand jury guaranty. That relationship was not thereafter
disturbed by either the House or the Senate because the Senate's Arti-
cle the Seventh was ultimately adopted verbatim by both houses and
incorporated in that form into the Constitution.
The net effect of the Senate's manipulations was to reaffirm all
283 Id. at 46 n.7; see Warren, supra note 197, at 120. The House's Article the Eighth
had read:
No person shall be subject, except in case of impeachment, to more than one
trial, or one punishment for the same offence, nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.
BILL OF RIGHTS 214.
234 BILL oF RIG os 218. See generally Henderson 312-1. The Senate made one deletion
from the House's tenth article besides the petit jury guaranty: it eliminated the exception
for "cases of impeachment." Presumably this occurred because retention of the provisiorn
as an exception to the grand jury guaranty would be unnecessary in light of the Con-
sitution's already prescribed method of instituting impeachment proceedings (art. I, § 2).
In any case, in view of the specific exception for impeachment cases in article III, section
2, no intent on the part of the members of the first Congress to apply the right to trial by
petit jury or indictment by grand jury to cases of impeachment may be imputed. See
generally Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," 44 So. CALiF. L.
REV. 395 (1971); Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Pro-
visions, 39 FomDHAw L. REV. 1 (1970); Thompson & Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges:
An Historical Overview, 49 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1970).
The House's civil jury amendment, Article the Twelfth, was also combined by the
Senate with the House's Article the Eleventh relating to appeals in civil cases (BILL OF
RIGHTS 215) and redesignated as Article the Ninth. Id. at 46 n.8, 218-19; see I DEBATES &
PROCMINGS 76. Eventually this provision became the seventh amendment to the Constitu-
tion. See note 176 supra. For the relationship of this amendment to the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73), see THE JouRNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY
92-106 (C. Beard ed. 1927); Warren, supra note 197. The Senate totally rejected Madison's
proposals relating to state jury trials. See 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 76; BILL OF RiGHTS
4647 & n.11. See generally 1 DEBATES & PROCEDINGS 755 (Madison); Warren, supra note 197,
at 121.
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the House proposals concerning the rights auxiliary to a jury trial,
but to reject the basic jury guaranty itself. The probable explanation
for this anomaly is provided by Madison in a contemporaneous letter
to Edmund Pendleton:
The Senate have sent back the plan of amendments with
some alterations which strike in my opinion at the most salutary
articles. In many of the States juries even in criminal cases, are
taken from the State at large; in others from districts of consider-
able extent; in very few from the County alone. Hence a [dislike]
to the restraint with respect to vicinage, which has produced a
negative on that clause.235
Apparently, in its frustration over failing to reach any agreement about
the appropriate scope of the vicinage, the Senate preferred to discard
the underlying jury guaranty.
Unwilling to accept all the Senate changes, 238 the House requested
the appointment of a conference committee with the Senate.23 1 Ap-
parently the primary area of disagreement within the conference
committee continued to be the House's demand for a petit jury guaranty
and the Senate's concern over the extent of the vicinage.23 The con-
ference committee ultimately agreed upon a compromise: the Consti-
tution was to guarantee that the jury be at least drawn from the state
in which the crime was committed, and the Congress was to be per-
mitted to narrow the vicinage through the legislative creation of judicial
districts. The significant event for purposes of this article, however, is
that the words which were to convey this compromise were not re-
combined with the grand jury guaranty in what was then the Senate's
seventh article. Instead, they were inserted into the Senate's eighth
article after the guaranty of a speedy and public trial:
235 5 MADISON 420 n.1 (emphasis in original). See generally HE i.ER 93-94; Henderson
313. The issue of the breadth of the vicinage for the criminal jury also bred substantial
disagreement among the Congressmen in their debates on the first Judiciary Act. Warren,
supra note 197, at 105-06. There were also problems caused by the confusion between
venue and vicinage. See note 177 supra.
236 The Senate made a total of 26 changes in the 17 propositions submitted to it by
the House. See 1 DEBATES & PRocyDINGS, 80, 85-86. See generally BILL OF RIGHMs 34-35 n.6.
237 1 DEBATES & PROCEEOINGS 905; id. at 83. Madison, Sherman, and John Vining were
appointed as the House component of the committee.
238 On September 23, Madison again wrote to Edmund Pendleton:
[The Senate is] inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of Juries. The
vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a term, too vague if de-
pending on limits to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if limited to
the County. It was proposed to insert after the word Juries, "with the ac-
customed requisites," leaving the definition to be construed according to the
judgment of professional men. Even this could not be obtained. The truth is that
in most of the States the practice is different, and hence the irreconcileable [sic]
difference of ideas on the subject. In some States, jurors are drawn from the whole
body of the community indiscriminately; in others, from large districts compre-
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation-to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him-to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defence.239
The conference committee report and the amendments over which
there had been no dispute were all approved by the House240 and
Senate2 41 and were transmitted to the states for ratification.242 Upon
ratification by Virginia on December 15, 1791,243 the last ten of these
became the Bill of Rights.244 The first two amendments proposed by
Congress to the states having been rejected,245 the seventh article
guaranteeing the right to a grand jury indictment became the fifth
amendment and the eighth article guaranteeing the right to a trial
by petit jury became the sixth amendment to the Constitution. 2 6
Why the conference committee did not replace the petit jury guar-
anty in the fifth amendment from which it had come is impossible to
say. The recorded debates fail to clarify this issue. Two plausible but
admittedly speculative explanations may be offered. The first is that
hending a number of Counties; and in a few only from a single County. The
Senate suppose also that the provision for vicinage in the Judiciary bill, will
sufficiently quiet the fears which called for an amendment on this point. On a
few other points in the plan the Senate refuse to join the House of Reps.
5 MADISON 424 n.1 (emphasis in original).
239 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 913 (emphasis added).
240 Id. at 913.
241 Id. at 88; see id. at 914.
242 Id. at 923.
243 BILL OF RIGHTS 50. See generally 2 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 1983-89.
244 Unfortunately, no satisfactory body of literature exploring the ratification process
of the Bill of Rights is available. Suffice it to say, however, that Congress's amendments
did not receive universal and immediate approbation. Although not elaborately docu-
mented, the two-year delay between Congress's passage of the amendments and ratification
by the requisite 11 states was occasioned by substantial opposition from the Antifederalists.
A. MASON, supra note 83, at 95-97. Indeed, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia
never ratified the Bill of Rights until 1939. See BILL OF RIGHTS 49-50; Dewey, A Vote of
Confidence for the Bill of Rights, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIsr. 137, 139 & nn.6-8 (1963).
245 The first two amendments which the 1789 Congress proposed to the states related
to the numerical size of the House of Representatives and the method of increasing the
compensation of Senators and Representatives. BILL OF R GHrs 220. These two amendments
were never ratified by the states, leaving only the last 10 of the original amendments,
which we have come to call the Bill of Rights.
246 Every state which has entered the Union since the ratification of the federal Bill
of Rights in 1791 has a similar guaranty of the right to trial by jury and indictment by
grand jury.
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the rearrangement by the Senate of the propositions submitted to it by
the House resulted in the language of the sixth amendment being more
grammatically amenable than that of the fifth amendment to the
compromise jury clause agreed upon by the conference committee.247
On the other hand, it may well be that our familiarity with the
language of the two amendments as we have inherited them is what
gives this impression of linguistic neatness. The more likely explanation
is that the sixth amendment insertion was merely an oversight. By
the time the conference committee had been appointed on September
21, 1789, the members of Congress had become weary of their labors
and were anxious to return home. Passage of amendments to the
Constitution was the major obstacle to adjournment. Indeed, once
the conference committee had been appointed, events moved rapidly;
the committee's report was considered and accepted by the House on
September 24,248 and concurred in by the Senate on September 25.249
By September 29 the amendments had been passed and both houses
had adjourned.2 50 Perhaps in its haste Congress neglected to notice
the ambiguity it had left in regard to the jury and the military.251
247 Henderson 323.
248 1 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 913.
249 1d. at 88.
250 Id. at 94, 928.
251 See Henderson 305, 324. The hypothesis that the restoration of the petit jury
provision by the conference committee also effectively reinstated the military exception
to that provision runs counter to the import of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
recent case of Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court in that case construed
the conference committee's use of the phrase "impartial jury" as an indication that
unanimity for conviction, the right to challenge, and other accoutrements of the common
law jury were not intended to be perpetuated in the Constitution. Id. at 96-97. The
specific holding of the case was that the "accustomed requisite" of a 12-man jury was not
mandated by the sixth amendment. With all due respect, I suggest that the Court was
wrong in its conclusion. For one thing, such a construction renders the sixth amendment
jury provision almost identical to the article III provision and therefore virtually mean-
ingless. Secondly, if the Court is willing to accept only those accoutrements or exceptions
to the common law jury which were explicitly delineated by the conference committee, it
would perhaps be led to conclude that, despite the specific exemption in article III, the
conference committee's deletion of the exception to the right to jury trial for cases of
impeachment (see note 234 supra) indicated a desire to eliminate that exception. To
respond that the exception was deleted because it was already provided for in article III
proves too much, for the very right to trial by jury was also already provided for in
article III. For these reasons the Williams case appears to have been based upon erroneous
historical analysis. This does not mean that the case was therefore incorrectly decided,
but only that the Court was incorrect in not construing the conference committee's
phrase "impartial jury" to be a shorthand form for the full jury trial -guaranty---except
for the vicinage element-as it was originally proposed to the Congress by Madison. and-
passed by the House of Representatives.
One flaw in the oversight theory is raised by a historical peculiarity contemporaneous
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CONCLUSION
Although neither of these theories supplies a totally satisfactory
explanation for the discrepancy between the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, there is at least nothing extant affirmatively indicating that the
jury was ever actually intended to be required in military trials or
even that the issue was consciously left constitutionally unresolved.
Even the Senate, at whose feet lies the blame for the initial separation
of the petit jury guaranty and the military exception, manifested no
desire to apply trial by jury to the military. On the contrary, a motion
to restore the petit jury guaranty-with its military exception-had
been made in the Senate just prior to its return of the proposed con-
stitutional amendments to the House on September 9.252 Although it
failed to pass because the vote resulted in a tie,253 its defeat is undoubt-
edly attributable to the continuing dispute over the extent of the
vicinage of the jury and not to any objections about its military
exception. In any case, the familiarity of the framers of the Bill of
Rights with the nature of the court-martial and the jury, the express
exemption of the military from the criminal jury trial guaranty in
both Madison's original proposals and those approved by the House,
and the dearth of any evidence to indicate that the framers desired to
depart from the traditions of their forefathers, almost inevitably
lead to the conclusion that the failure expressly to exempt the military
from the sixth amendment's jury trial guaranty was little more than
a historical accident. 25
with Congress's 1789 passage of the Bill of Rights. In 1790, a Pennsylvania constitutional
convention precisely duplicated the language of the fifth and sixth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States in its state constitution of that year. 5 CONSTITUTIONS
no-ol (art. 9, §§ 9-10); see also 1 id. at 568-69 (art. 1, §§ 5, 8) (Del.); id. at 538 (art. I,
§ 9) (Conn.); 4 id. at 2473 (art. 16) (N.H.); 6 id. at 3223 (art. 1, §§ 7, 10) (R.I.); id. at 3764
(art. 17) (Vt.). See generally Henderson 313-14. In addition, the federal pattern was repeated
again in 1861 when the so-called Confederate States of America perpetuated the petit
jury-grand jury anomaly by incorporating verbatim the language of the fifth and sixth
amendments into its own constitution. See C. LEE, THE COMnMMUT CONSETUTIONS 201-
20 (1963).
252 The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger) shall be by an impartial Jury of the vicinage, with the requisite
of unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge, and other accustomed re-
quisites.
Quoted in Henderson 313 n.120.
253 See id.
254 This is the position which has consistently been taken by the Supreme Court
in regard to courts-martial. E.g., Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1 (1957); Whelchel v. McDonald,
840 U.S. 122 (1950); Ex parte Quixin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
Neither indictment by grand jury nor trial by petit jury has been judicially required
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Congressional intention to exclude the military from the .sixth
amendment's petit jury provision is also clearly established by other
actions taken by Congress contemporaneously with the passage of
the Bill of Rights. For example, on September 17, 1789, a committee
reported out to the House of Representatives an act "to recognise, and
adapt to the Constitution of the United States, the establishment of
the troops raised under the resolves of the United States in Congress
assembled." 255 This measure first passed the House 256 and then passed
the Senate with several amendments. 257 Succumbing to Senate desires
for an amendment relating to activation of the militia,258 the House
agreed to the bill, and it was enacted into law.259 Section 4 of that act
prescribed that
the said troops [raised by the -Continental Congress's resolve of
October 3, 1787] shall be governed by the rules and articles of
war, which have been established by the United States in Con-
gress assembled, or by such rules and articles of war as may here-
after by law be established. 200
in the case of military commissions. War criminals: Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); see Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (194);
Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879 (1949). Spies: Ex parte-
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754 (E.D.N.Y.
1920); 40 Op. ATr'y GEN. 561 (1919). Military Government: Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304 (1946); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901). Prisoners of War: Ex parte
Milligan, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). Martial Law: id.; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849). See generally Kaplan, supra note 146.
Indeed, Congress has made it clear in the UCMJ that, except in the case of martial
law or military government, criminal prosecutions of persons in the above categories
need not be accomplished by a military commission, but may be by a court-martial itself.
10 U.S.C. §§ 801 (war criminals), 802(9) (prisoners of war), 906 (spies) (1970); see id. § 904
(aiding the enemy). Article 21 of the UCMJ makes it clear that these grants of jurisdiction
to courts-martial are not meant to preclude the convening of military commissions:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by
the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals.
Id. § 821.
255 1 D ATFs 8: PRoC NGS 894.
256 Id. at 85, 927.
257 Id. at 91.
258 The amendment expressed the Senate's desire,
for striking out all that respected the number of the militia to be called into
service for the defence of the frontiers, from the States of Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Georgia, and to insert a clause instead thereof, empowering the President
to call out the militia generally, for the purpose of protecting the frontiers
against the hostile invasion of the Indians ....
Id. at 927; see also id. at 93-94.
259 Id. at 927; id. at 93-94. The Senate's version of the clause quoted in note 258
supra was adopted as section 5 of the final act. 2 id. at 2200.
260 Id.
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Here is a manifestation of Congress's recognition-during the very
period in which it passed the Bill of Rights-that the army was to con-
tinue to be governed by its traditional and separate system of courts-
martial, unaffected by the proposed new constitutional amendment
guaranteeing the right to a trial by petit jury.261
The only remaining unresolved issue regarding the fifth and sixth
amendments' military exceptions relates to the militia. The fifth amend-
ment-and therefore the sixth by implication-leaves no doubt that
the militia is excepted from its provisions only "when in actual service
in time of war or public danger." Within the context of the fifth
amendment, it is clear that this language refers to federal service.
However, by adopting the contention that Congress-under article I,
section 8, of the Constitution--does in fact possess court-martial juris-
diction over the state militia forces at all times, it is admittedly pos-
sible to reach the anomalous conclusion that it must-by virtue of the
fifth and sixth amendments-provide the right to indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury in all courts-martial arising in units serving
solely in a state capacity.
But the derivation of the militia portion of the military exemption
from the fifth amendment does not sanction such a ludicrous result. The
precursor of the militia clause was offered by Madison in direct response
to Antifederalist fears about federal control over the state militia.
Thus, the militia clause should properly be construed not only as an
261 Compare Henderson with Wiener, supra note 61. See generally W. AycocK & S.
WurFEL, supra note 100, at 13; SNEDErcER 22. The act was repealed by the second session
of the first Congress and replaced by "An Act for regulating the military establishment
of the United States" of which section 13 stated:
That the commisioned officers, non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians,
aforesaid, shall be governed by the rules and articles of war, which have been
established by the United States in Congress assembled, as far as the same may
be applicable to the Constitution of the United States, or by such rules and
articles as may hereafter by law be established.
2 DEBATEs & PROCEEDINGS 2224-25 (emphasis added). See also WINTHROP 23 n.43. At the
time of the passage of the Bill of Rights in 1789, Congress did not have occasion to ac-
commodate the naval disciplinary regulations to the Constitution because no navy then
existed. See note 118 supra. Five years later, however, Congress reestablished the American
Navy. Act of March 27, 1794, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350; see Smelser, The Passage of the Naval
Act of 1794, 22 MIL. AFAIms 1 (1958). In 1797 Congress enacted a law similar to that
relating to the Army, adopting the Articles for the Government of the Navy of 1775,
as amended, "as far as the same may be applicable to the constitution." Act of July
1, 1797, ch. 8, § 8, 1 Stat. 523. The Navy's military justice system was completely revised
two years later by the enactment of the Articles for the Government of the Navy of
1799. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 709. This revision, however, in no way intro-
duced trial by jury into naval courts-martial. See generally Devico, supra note 104, at 65;
Sargent, supra note 107, at 707-08; Wiener, supra note 61, at 13-14; Williams, supra note
94, at 357.
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exception to the federally secured rights to a grand and petit jury,
but also as a limitation upon the federal powers over state military
justice. If the fifth amendment is construed as complementary to article
I, section 8, it would appear that the framers did not intend to authorize
federal courts-martial of state militiamen when not in federal service.
In fact, the framers implied as much by their passage in 1792 of the
first Militia Act 262 by which the militia was subjected to the federal
Army Articles of War only when in actual federal service.263 Although
such legislation is not conclusive of the issue, it certainly provides a
persuasive indication of early congressional acceptance of its own lack
of penal power over nonfederalized militia.264
262 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 ("An Act to provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions').
For the debates in Congress concerning this act, see 3 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS 555, 557,
574-80. This law was superseded by a similar provision in the Act of February 28, 1795,
ch. 36, § 4, 1 Stat. 424. See also Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 38, 1 Stat. 271. See generally
J. DUcGAN, Tnn LEGISLATvE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONCEPT OF
CoNSCRIPTION FOR MIrrAy SERVICE (1946); 2 STORY 117; WINTHRoP 75-77, 95; Militia Clause
187, 196. In the debates concerning these early militia bills, the term "discipline" was not
used in the sense of military justice, but in the sense of military training or exercises.
See, e.g., 2 DEBA ES & PRoZ MINGs 1807, 2090-92, 2098-99; notes 154-63 & 184-85 and accom-
panying text supra.
263 On September 8, 1789 the Senate rejected a motion to add the following clause to
the proposed amendments to the Constitution:
That each State respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or
neglect to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial
law, except when in actual service in time of war, invasion or rebellion; and when
not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines,
penalties, and punishments as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own
State.
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BEGUN
AND HELD AT THE CITY O" Nmv YORK 226 (1789). Although there is no contemporary
explanation for the Senate's action, it may be suggested that the amendment was rejected
because its terms were already implicit in article I, section 8, of the Constitution and
what was ultimately to become the fifth amendment.
264 In any case, Congress appears to have avoided this issue by legislative manipula.
tion. Beginning with the National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 89 Stat. 166, Congress has
conditioned its distribution of federal monies and material to state militia units upon
their securing a status known as "federal recognition." 82 U.S.C. §§ 108, 323 (1970);
Federal Recognition of Army National Guard Officers, Nat'l Guard Reg. 600-102 (1965);
Organization and Federal Recognition of Army National Guard Units, Nat'l Guard Reg.
10-1 (1971). As a condition of such federal recognition, Congress has required, inter alia,
that the states utilize a federally-prescribed system of military justice for their militia
units when not in federal service. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, §§ 102-08, 39 Stat.
166. See generally Military Affairs, Dep't Army Pamphlet 27-187, at 34-36 (1966); Militia
Clause 201-15; Shaw, supra note 123, at 70, 72-73.
The federal military justice system prescribed by the acts of Congress, however, is not
self-executing and must be incorporated by the states into their own positive law. Some
variation among the states is apparently permitted within the interstices of the federal
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The purpose and scope of this article has been limited to a delinea-
tion of the historical constitutional relationship of the jury and the
court-martial. Left for another day is the perhaps more significant
scheme because that scheme is merely outlined by the federal statutes and is not itself
comprehensive of military justice. See Bacon, The Model State Guard Act, 10 FORDHAM
L. REV. 41 (1941). Furthermore, when courts-martial are convened for the trial of National
Guardsmen not in federal service, the trials are conducted by state, not federal military
personnel. 32 U.S.C. § 326 (1970); see also 10 id. § 802(1) (1970); Manual for Courts-
Martial A2-3 (rev. ed. 1969); id. at 412 (1951); DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF TnE ARmy, 1912-1940, § 395(5) (1942).
Obvious constitutional questions were raised by this conditioning of the receipt of
federal benefits upon the states' sacrifice of what is probably their constitutional right
to determine the military justice scheme regulating their militia forces when not in federal
service. See Ansell, Status of the State Militia Under the Hay Bill, 30 HARv. L. R v. 712
(1917); Chiperfield, The Legal Status of the National Guard Under the Army Reorganiza.
tion Bill, 7 J. Am. INST. CRim. L. & CRrMINoLoGY 672 (1917); Militia Clause 201-15; Under-
hill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United States over Civilians, 12 CALIF. L.
REv. 75, 92 (1924). See also Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights,
35 COLum. L. Rav. 321 (1935). Congress, however, appears to have surmounted this con-
stitutional hurdle through the use of a legal fiction. Utilizing its constitutional power
to raise armies rather than its power to regulate the militia, Congress in 1933 constituted
the National Guards of the several states as a permanent reserve component of the United
States Army, to be known as the National Guard of the United States. Act of June 15,
1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153. By virtue of that and other legislation, every person who becomes
a member of a federally-recognized state National Guard unit also automatically becomes
a member of that state's element of the National Guard of the United States. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 101(11), 3261 (1970); 32 id. §§ 101(5), 301 (1970). Consequently, he is subject to the
federal system of military justice prescribed for that component even when not in actual
federal service. The net result is that Congress has apparently avoided the strictures placed
by the Constitution upon its powers to regulate the penal systems of the state militia when
not in federal service.
Nevertheless, wholly state-issued codes of military justice retain perhaps one area of
continued vitality. This is in relation to those local military forces known as the State
Guards which have occasionally been raised by the states solely for their own internal
protection. The maintenance of such forces has not been prohibited by federal statutes
except during peacetime. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1970). They have in fact been expressly
authorized by Congress on several separate occasions. E.g., Act of Sept. 27, 1950, ch. 1058,
64 Stat. 1072; Act of Oct. 21, 1940, ch. 904, 54 Stat. 904; Act of June 14, 1917, ch. 28,
40 Stat. 181. See generally SENATE COMM. ON MILrrARY AFFAIRS, THE HOME GUARD, S.
REP. No. 2138, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); Militia Clause 215-17; Shaw, supra note 123, at
76. Moreover, the Constitution itself appears to authorize the maintenance of such forces
in wartime if accomplished with the consent of Congress. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10. See note
143 and accompanying text supra. The State Guards have not been treated by Congress
as part of the National Guards, nor have they been subjected to the federal laws governing
the National Guards. Whether Congress could, on the one hand, treat them as part of the
states' militia and deal with them under the National Guard laws or, on the other hand,
condition its constitutional consent to their wartime existence upon their adoption of
federally-imposed standards (including a federal system of military justice), are questions
which as yet remain unresolved.
Moreover, there is a question about the constitutional and legislative status of the
local forces of the District of Columbia and the federal territories. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention dearly contemplated granting Congress power only over the
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inquiry into the history and current role of the two as judicial and
political institutions. In his classic assertion of the incompatibility of
military and civilian concepts of justice, General William T. Sherman
expressed the prevailing attitude:
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being
in a community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible,
consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to
govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exer-
cising the largest measure of force at the will of the nation.
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each re-
quires its own separate system of laws, statute and common. An
army is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man.
Every enactment, every change of rules which impairs the princi-
ple weakens the army, impairs its value, and defeats the very ob-
ject of its existence.2 65
On the other hand, the validity of this assessment is weakened
by the increasingly successful and still evolving "civilianization" of
military justice.2 66 Despite the absence of a constitutional mandate, the
militia of the several states. E.g., 2 REcoRDs 326, 330-33. Although the army clause of the
Constitution probably would have authorized Congress to raise local troops in the District
of Columbia and the territories, Congress's first legislative act in this regard apparently
eschewed such an approach; it was entitled, "An act, more effectually to provide for the
organization of the militia of the District of Columbia." Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 20, 2
Stat. 215 (emphasis added). On the other hand, although mentioning "militia," this
act and its successors have been construed to be authorized not by Congress's constitutional
power to regulate the militia but by its powers to "exercise exclusive Legislation" over the
District of Columbia (U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8) and to "make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions" for the territories (id. art. IV, § 3). United States v. Stewart, 2 F. Cas. 280 (No. 16)
(D.C. Crim. Ct. 1857); WInrmop 55 n.67.
Regardless of whether such legislation was authorized under the army clause or the
clauses granting legislative power over the District and the territories, it would appear
that the absence of an intervening sovereign would justify Congress's treating the local
District and territorial forces as being constantly in federal service. Congress, however,
has not chosen to do this. It has in fact treated these local defense forces as "militia"
forces equivalent to the state National Guards (see 10 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1970); 32 id.
§§ 101(5), 326-33; D.C. CODE ANN. § 39-106 (1967)) and therefore subject only to the same
system of military justice when not in federal service as the state militia forces. See
Militia Clause 213; Shaw, supra note 123, at 61. Qn the other hand, this action may
well be a distinction without a difference. When called into federal service, the District
and territorial National Guards-like the National Guards of the states-are subject
to the military penal law of the United States armed forces, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1970). As to the National Guard of the District of Columbia,
Congress has filled out the military justice scheme of the federal laws relating to militia
not in federal service by also prescribing the UCMJ. D.C. CODE ANN. § 39-704 (1967).
Consequently, whether in federal or local service, such National Guard forces are governed
by precisely the same penal regulations.
265 Quoted in Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Special Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1949).
266 See Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. Rnv. 3 (1970).
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court-martial has progressively provided many of the traditional safe-
guards of the civilian jury. To what extent significant contrasts between
the court-martial and the jury endure and to what extent these contrasts
are based upon true functional distinctions between the institutions
remain open questions. It just may be, however, that General Sherman
was wrong and that the military can indeed afford the luxury of that
institution which Blackstone once described as the "palladium" of
English liberties.267
267 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349. See also 2 STORY 597; THE BAsic IDEAS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 364 (R. Morris ed. 1956).
